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Countering corruption in Bulgaria needs to go further than institutional or
legislative measures and be be aimed at creating the kind of political and
economic culture which is built on trust in public institutions, transparency
and accountability of all actions of the public administration and a deter-
mination to achieve a stable and predictable economic and social environ-
ment.
Coalition 2000 is an initiative of Bulgarian non-governmental organizations
launched in the spring of 1997 with the aim to help restrict corruption in
Bulgarian society through a partnership between state institutions, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and individuals, who developed and have been
implementing an Anti-Corruption Action Plan, a Corruption Monitoring
System, and an anti-corruption public awareness campaign.
The Corruption Assessment Report—2003 follows the approach of the
Action Plan adopted by the Policy Forum in November 1998. The Report
contains a general evaluation of the state and dynamics of corruption in
Bulgarian society and of anti-corruption efforts in the year 2003 emphasiz-
ing the anti-corruption dimensions of judicial reform in Bulgaria. 
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The level of corruption in Bulgaria did not change significantly in 2003.
Corruption is still perceived to be one of the gravest problems of socie-
ty. This is indicated by the Coalition 2000 Corruption Indexes, which meas-
ure the spread of corruption and the perceptions of the general population,
the business community and analysts.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the country’s ranking in the
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index for 2003.
Bulgaria ranks 54th among 133 states included in the survey, indicating that
there is a considerable amount of corruption in the country with no
detectable deterioration from the previous period. The decrease of the TI
composite index for Bulgaria from 4.0 in 2002 to 3.9 in 2003 is within the
margin of error1, while its plunge from 45th to 54th place in the interna-
tional ranking was due to the inclusion of 29 additional states in the survey.
Nevertheless, Bulgaria’s scores are equal to those of the Czech Republic
and higher than those of some states acceding to EU in 2004, namely
Poland, Latvia and Slovakia.
The steady corruption level is in contrast to the Bulgarian public’s expecta-
tions for improvement. This lack of development signals that the anti-cor-
ruption measures undertaken so far have been exhausted. In the last few
years, anti-corruption efforts have, to a certain extent, succeeded, due to
certain “soft” forms of curbing corruption, i.e., by means of extensive pub-
lic pressure. However, few of the essential structural faults that breed
corruption in various segments of society have been remedied.
The corruption-friendly institutional environment is especially harmful since
it fosters broader penetration of organized crime into the economy of the
country. Informal economic actors are currently striving to migrate into the
legal economy and partake in new investment projects. The legalization of
dirty money continues. It is accomplished by buying off politicians, senior
magistrates, and public officials authorized to administer services of
considerable public interest, including the issuance of licenses or per-
mits.
The main challenge of the annual assessment of corruption in Bulgaria is
distinguishing actual corrupt practices from the accusations of corruption
used in partisan politics. Two divergent trends are evident in this context.
The first is the destabilization of political life which expands opportuni-
ties for corrupt practices. Interest groups lobbying for private economic or
criminal interests are becoming ever more active. As conflicts between the 
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groups have been aggravated, various forms of political corruption have
become public. Unfortunately, the main political parties have commonly
used anti-corruption rhetoric to discredit political rivals. Thus, public trust
in anti-corruption efforts has diminished. 
A contrasting trend concerns the plummeting of corruption-generating
resources. In comparison to the political sphere—where the very institu-
tional structure promotes opacity and impunity—a sustainable positive
trend has been observed in the economy. In 2003, major foreign and inter-
national corporations started to operate in the country, thereby introducing
advanced standards of accountability and facilitating the adoption of inter-
national ethics norms in business.Together with the government’s anti-cor-
ruption measures, this has brought about a shrinking of the grey sector.
Over 300,000 people, previously employed in the shadow economy, have
entered into legal employment. As a result, tax revenues have risen, not
least due to positive developments in the customs administration as well. In
addition, in 2003 the privatization of two state-owned banks, DKS Bank and
Biochim—respectively the third and fourth largest banks in Bulgaria—was
completed. Bank privatization, along with the Currency Board, was as a fac-
tor in restraining the capacity of political parties to influence economic
decisions. In general, the fact that over 75% of the GDP is already pro-
duced by the private sector will curb political interference in the economy
in the long run. In the short term, however, economic policy continues to
be influenced by lobby groups. A telling example of that was the failure of
privatization transactions for the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company
and the Bulgarian tobacco monopolist, Bulgartabac Holding. 
Evident in the public debate in 2003 was the continuing belief that corrupt
officials are, in effect, immune to punishment, and the reason for that was
considered to be the low effectiveness or lack of action by law enforce-
ment and the judicial authorities. Corruption in the judiciary itself was
widely debated, and was cited as discrediting the core ideals of justice,
democracy, and rule of law. Public expectations for future reforms in the
judiciary are very high, as a profound transformation is considered neces-
sary, instead of the skin-deep measures against institutional and political
corruption that have been undertaken so far. 
The Corruption Assessment Report—2003 incorporates the main assess-
ments, conclusions and suggestions concerning the anti-corruption aspects
of judicial reform laid down in the Judicial Anti-Corruption Program. At the
same time, CAR—2003 stresses the links between corruption as a general
issue and the need to establish an effective, stable and clean judicial system
as the key rule of law instrument for curbing of corruption in society. This
approach also seeks to bring about a consensus between decision makers
on the general principles, as well as the particular immediate and long-term
goals of judicial reform. 
The complex challenges of judicial reform, including anti-corruption meas-
ures, can be met only on the basis of an agreement between the political
parties, on the one hand, and between policy makers and civil society
acting in concert, on the other. The cooperation of all units of the judici-
ary is also an indispensable condition. The bipartisan Declaration on the
Reform of the Bulgarian Judicial System of April 2, 2003, signed by the parlia-
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mentary political parties, as well as the constitutional amendments, adopt-
ed almost unanimously in September, could serve as a basis for a broad
consensus on the judicial reform goals. The balance between the various
branches of power should be a special consideration in the process of coun-
teracting and preventing corruption, concentration of power and abuse of
office.
INTRODUCTION 7
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The objective of the Corruption Monitoring System of Coalition 20002 (CMS) is
to measure the level of corruption (defined as the number of corruption
transactions concluded in a given period of time) in the country.
Additionally, the CMS also aims to account for the public attitudes and
expectations related to the observed level of corruption. In response to
the frequently raised criticism that what is actually measured are people’s
perceptions rather than the actual level of corruption, it should be noted
that the CMS is designed to measure both the perception aspects of cor-
ruption and the objectively observed frequency of corruption transactions.
Due to the fact that corruption is a complex phenomenon, any system of
dynamic measurement introduces certain conditionalities, which predeter-
mine the content of the data and the possibilities for their interpretation. In
this respect, the main advantage of CMS, which has been utilized since
1998, is the comparability of data over time. The considerable mass of infor-
mation that has already been collected enables long-term trends to be
explored and allows random deviations to be eliminated. The main princi-
ple used in the construction of the CMS is that corruption is a crime with a
high latency level (as a rule, it is not reported to law enforcement authori-
ties and hence not registered in official statistics) and therefore the degree
of its spread can be measured solely through victimization surveys. In this
sense, the approach to establishing the frequency of corruption transactions
is identical to the methodology for measuring the frequency of other types
of crime. 
The working definition of corruption used in the CMS is: the abuse of
power or official position for personal gain. Cases of corruption under this
definition can be described as the non-regulated (i.e., informal) transfer of
resources from private persons to civil servants for the purpose of receiving
a certain favor in exchange. The favor could be legal, where the employee
does not violate the law and the favor involves the regular performance of
his or her official duties, or it could be a favor that basically presupposes the
violation of certain laws or other norms and/or rules. 
9
2 This report presents only the more significant data and conclusions related to the research pro-
gram of Coalition 2000. The full reports on all monitoring that has been conducted are accessi-
ble at the web sites of Coalition 2000 (www.anticorruption.bg) and Vitosha Research
(www.vitosha-research.com).
A. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION
The level of corruption is determined by two basic types of transactions: 1) effective
conclusion of corruption transaction (actual transfer of resources), which, in the CMS
context, is identified as “real corruption”; and, 2) transactions related to requesting
or offering a corruption transaction, which in the CMS context is identified as “poten-
tial corruption”. The differentiation between these two types of corruption is condi-
tional; in many cases the very request or offer of a corruption transaction is consid-
ered a crime and should also be seen as corruption. 
The definition adopted in the CMS enables a relatively accurate account for the
types of corruption that are linked with the direct transfer of resources (money, gifts,
or services). Left outside the scope of this definition are the forms of corruption
which do not presuppose a direct transfer of resources, but are linked with abuse of
power such as, trading in influence, the use of official information for personal gains,
nepotism, clientelism, etc. 
The indicator “level of corruption” reflects the number of corruption trans-
actions actually concluded by the population for a given period of time.
These are arrangements in which the citizens of the country and the repre-
sentatives of the business sector have admitted to participation. This is an
indicator which reflects the actual frequency of a certain type of events in
the everyday lives of citizens and businesses (as opposed to reflecting the
perceptions of citizens and businesses). 
The values of the 2003 indexes for levels of corruption among the popula-
tion and the business sector are the lowest since 1998. No significant
changes occurred during the year (see Charts 1 and 2). This justifies the
conclusion that the level of corruption in the country in 2003 is neither
increasing nor decreasing. The absolute number of corruption transac-
tions carried out by citizens and companies, however, is still disturbingly
high. The average monthly number of corruption transactions which cor-
responds to an index value of 0.4 (for the population) is about 100,000. For
10 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2003
Ä.1. Level of 
Corruption— 
Corruption 
Transactions
TYPES OF CORRUPTION 
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION 
Types of corruption Real corruption Potential corruption
Measured indicator Number of transactions Number of cases of
concluded by a given request of non-regulated 
type of actor transfer of resources 
CMS index Personal involvement Corruption pressure
LEVELS OF CORRUPTION STUDIED BY THE CMS
Low level (small corruption)
Actors/type of survey Citizens/survey of the population 
Used resource Small
Medium level (medium corruption)
Actors/type of survey Business representatives/survey of the 
business sector 
Used resource Medium-large
the business sector, the
average monthly value of
the index for 2003 is about
1.2, which corresponds to
about 4,000 corruption
transactions. 
The consequences on the
citizens, given the observed
levels of corruption, are
several. First, the use of cor-
ruption transactions creates
inequality, since those giv-
ing bribes benefit from the
services of the state to a
larger degree. Second, the
existence of a sufficiently
large incidence of corrup-
tion transactions prompts
some civil servants to create
situations in which the giv-
ing of bribes becomes “ne-
cessary”, in this way creat-
ing a market for their “ser-
vices”. Third, in time, the
criteria for making decisions
in the different departments
of the administration tend
to become distorted. 
Whereas corruption transac-
tions within citizens’ services
raise the problems of social
justice and administrative
efficiency, the use of cor-
ruption transactions in the
business sector significantly
distorts the market and com-
petitive environment. As reported by company managers, corruption trans-
actions have turned into a significant factor, which has a distorting effect on: 
• the application of the regulative functions of the state (see Chart 3).
The data show that state regulations and prescripts are skirted by about
10-20% of the companies in the country (not taking into account com-
panies in the gray economy, which considerably increase the figures).
• the effective selection of suppliers for the needs of the state (see
Chart 4). Taking into account the fact that more than BGN 2.4 billion
(according to data of the Bulgarian Industrial Association), have been
spent through public procurement in 2003, the fact that in a significant
number of cases this happens by means of various corruption transac-
tions shows that a parallel system of interests exists in the country.  This
system shapes the concrete decisions of executives who start to derive 
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Corruption Pressure Corruption Transaction
ëHART 2 DYNAMICS OF THE INDEXES OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION FOR THE
BUSINESS SECTOR (OCTOBER 2000 – NOVEMBER 2003)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
 
Linear (Corruption Pressure) Linear (Corruption Transaction)
Corruption Pressure Corruption Transaction
ëHART 1 DYNAMICS OF THE INDEXES OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION 
FOR THE POPULATION (FEBRUARY 1999 – OCTOBER 2003)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
considerable benefits
from these transactions
at the expense of tax-
payers.
• the principles of free
competition among
companies (see Chart
5). The relatively large
number of contracts,
marked by the burden of
corruption transactions,
shows that in the “real
economy” of the coun-
try, corruption is poised
to become a peculiar tax
which ensures relative
economic well-being,
and is the price for stay-
ing in business. The
good news in this case is
that the statistics on the
incidence of corruption
in contractual relations
show a trend (albeit
weak) towards reduc-
tion.
A basic issue for the political
assessment of the level of
corruption is whether the
observed values of the indi-
cators are high or low. In
addition to tracing the
dynamics of the indicators,
two basic approaches are
possible in this respect:
international comparisons,
and subjective perceptions
of the degree of seriousness
of corruption as a social
problem. Regarding inter-
national comparisons, the
data of the relative position
of Bulgaria are contained in
the index of Transparency
International. The evolution of the country in the period after 1998, accord-
ing to the ranking of Transparency International is similar to the develop-
ments observed by the national surveys of Coalition 2000: there was positive
development in the period of 1998-2002, and a standstill in 2003. Among
the 133 countries included in the 2003 index of Transparency International,
Bulgaria occupies 54th place, which indicates a country with a serious cor-
ruption problem. 
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Base: December 2002.: N=147 (contact with a big company); N=155 (public procurement); March 2003.: 
N=98 (contact with a big company); N=91 (public procurement); June 2003.: N=136 (contact with a big company); 
N=133 (public procurement) November 2003.: N=140 (contact with a big company); N=121 (public procurement)
Comments on this rating
were published in the
media, asserting that,
according to business cir-
cles, corruption in the
country is increasing. A rea-
son for this is the fact that
the absolute value of the
index of Transparency
International decreased
from 4.0 in 2002 to 3.9 in
2003, as well as the fact that
for the same period the
country “dropped” from
45th to 54th place in the
international ranking. Such
a conclusion is not suffi-
ciently substantiated, since
the decrease of the value of
the index is smaller than the
standard deviation (see
Table 1); from a statistical
point of view it is not possi-
ble to speak of a change if
the change of the index
(0.1) is smaller than the
standard deviation (0.9).
The change of the position
of the country in the rank-
ing of Transparency Inter-
national is due mainly to
the fact that 133 countries
took part in the rankings for
2003, as compared to 102
in 2002 (Table 2). 
The overview of interna-
tional data for the country
shows the lack of statistically
significant changes after
2001. In this sense, the negative message of the data is not  that the situa-
tion in the country is deteriorating, but rather that no further positive devel-
opments have been observed. Clearly, the way in which corruption is com-
bated is no longer sufficient to ensure its further decrease. However, regard-
less of the unfavorable position of the country in the ranking, negative image
should not be exaggerated: Poland, the Czech Republic and other countries
in Eastern Europe occupy similar or the same position as Bulgaria in the inter-
national ranking. 
Several general conclusions may be drawn about the level of corruption:
• In 2003, the level of corruption in the country underwent no signif-
icant change. As shown by both national and international surveys, 
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TABLE 1 DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIVE STATUS OF BULGARIA IN 
THE RANKING OF TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 
Year Ranking Index Standard Number of Number of  
deviation surveys countries
2003 54 3.9 0.9 10 133
2002 45 4.0 0.9 7 102
2001 47 3.9 0.6 6 91
2000 52 3.5 0.4 6 90
1999 63 3.3 1.4 8 99
    March 2003 June 2003 November 2003
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
81–100 % of the contracts
61–80 % of the contracts
41–60 % of the contracts
21–40 % of the contracts
ÑÓ 20 % of the contracts
There are no conrtacts based on bribery
2,3
0,7
0,8
1,1
4,9
2,5
3,4
7,0
7,8
7,7
12,3
12,3
27,2
26,4
25,4
58,2
48,6
51,2
ëHART 5 SHARE OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN BRANCH 
PARTNERS INVOLVING BRIBES (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Base: March 2003: N=244; June 2003: N=284; November 2003: N=261
corruption neither dec-
reased nor increased.
The altered parameters
in the rankings of Trans-
parency International
should not be interpreted
as a negative change.
Firstly, the change in the
ranking of the country is
due to more states being
included in the survey
(102 in 2002 and 133 in
2003). Second, since the
change of the absolute
value of the index of
Transparency Interna-
tional from 4.0 to 3.9 falls
within the scope of stan-
dard deviation (for this
indicator it is 0.9 in 2003,
which exceeds the value
of the change), no con-
clusions may be drawn
about the fact that the
value of the index is actu-
ally increasing or de-
creasing. 
• The lack of change in
the level of corruption
in 2003 is a fact that has
negative meaning. The
expectations of the
Bulgarian public are for
corruption to be reduced
and to continuously
decrease, especially
when its level is dis-
turbingly high. Second,
the continued lack of
changes is likely to nega-
tively impact the posi-
tion of the country in
comparison to other
nations, due to the
progress they will make.
• The lack of positive or negative changes in the period after May 2002
clearly shows that the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures
implemented until this point has been exhausted. The progress made
in countering corruption in the period 1998-2002 was mainly due to
measures of an ethical and political nature. Basically, these are “soft”
forms of countering corruption, which reduce it through public pressure.
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TABLE 2 DYNAMICS OF THE POSITION OF BULGARIA IN THE
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL RANKING IN 2002 AND 2003
9 
ne
w
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ou
nt
ri
es
change of
index
v/s 2002
(+0,3)
6,3
6,1
6,1
(-0,1)
5,7
(+0,1)
5,6
(-0,1)
(+0,4)
(+0,1)
5,3
(+0,3)
5,2
(+0,1)
(-0,1)
(-0,1)
(-1,0)
4,6
(+0,1)
(-0,3)
4,5
4,5
(-0,1)
(-0,4)
(-0,2)
(+0,1)
(-0,2)
(-0,6)
(-0,1)
(-0,1)
(+0,2)
(-0,2)
(+0,1)
(+0,1)
(-0,1)
(+0,3)
(-0,3)
0
0
(-0,4)
(-0,1)
2002
Country Country CPI 2002
rank score
25 Portugal 6,3
27 Slovenia 6,0
28 Namibia 5,7
29 Estonia 5,6
29 Taiwan 5,6
31 Italy 5,2
32 Uruguay 5,1
33 Hungary 4,9
33 Malaysia 4,9
33 Trinidad & Tobago 4,9
36 Belarus 4,8
36 Lithuania 4,8
36 South Africa 4,8
36 Tunisia 4,8
40 Costa Rica 4,5
40 Jordan 4,5
40 Mauritius 4,5
40 South Korea 4,5
44 Greece 4,2
45 Brazil 4,0
45 Bulgaria 4,0
45 Jamaica 4,0
45 Peru 4,0
45 Poland 4,0
50 Ghana 3,9
51 Croatia 3,8
52 Czech Republic 3,7
52 Latvia 3,7
52 Morocco 3,7
52 Slovak Republic 3,7
52 Sri Lanka 3,7
57 Colombia 3,6
57 Mexico 3,6
59 China 3,5
59 Dominican Rep. 3,5
59 Ethiopia 3,5
62 Egypt 3,4
62 El Salvador 3,4
64 Thailand 3,2
64 Turkey 3,2
2003 
Country Country CPI 2003
rank score
25 Portugal 6,6
26 Oman 
27 Bahrain 
28 Cyprus 
29 Slovenia 5,9
30 Botswana 
31 Taiwan 5,7
32 Qatar 
33 Estonia 5,5
34 Uruguay 5,5
35 Italy 5,3
36 Kuwait 
37 Malaysia 5,2
38 United Arab Emirates 
39 Tunisia 4,9 
40 Hungary 4,8 
41 Lithuania 4,7 
42 Namibia 4,7 
43 Cuba 
Jordan 4,6
Trinidad & Tobago 4,6
46 Belize 
Saudi Arabia 
48 Mauritius 4,4
South Africa 4,4
50 Costa Rica 4,3
Greece 4,3
South Korea 4,3
53 Belarus 4,2
54 Brazil 3,9
55 Bulgaria 3,9
Czech Republic 3,9
57 Jamaica 3,8
Latvia 3,8
59 Colombia 3,7
Croatia 3,7
El Salvador 3,7
Peru 3,7
Slovakia 3,7
64 Mexico 3,6
Poland 3,6
66 China 3,4
The interest targeted in such cases is the fear of public exposure or moral
sanction. The interests which generate corruption (those which stem
from dysfunction in the structural organization of different spheres of
society), however, remain basically unaffected. Working in this direction
presupposes the construction of “hard” measures, which impact the use
of corruption as a mechanism for solving problems, generated by the
dysfunction of the social structure. It should be noted that progress in
this respect is fairly limited. Frequently one kind of dysfunctional mech-
anism is replaced with another; and many spheres which are particular-
ly susceptible to corruption are in principle left unaffected by reforms
(e.g., the funding of political parties).
A.2.1. Public Attitudes towards Corruption and the Role of the
Media 
The relative importance of corruption as a social problem decreased mar-
ginally (1%). Such a small decrease, however, does not warrant the claim
that the country has achieved any visible successes. In contrast to the prob-
lem of “unemployment”, for which data from government surveys confirm
positive development, corruption, together with crime, continues to be a
serious problem. Special attention should be paid to the fact that despite
several serious criminal incidents (demonstrative murders, bomb blasts,
abductions, etc.), which occurred in 2003 and the special attention com-
manded by the subject of “crime”, corruption preserves its level of
importance for the population.
In contrast to the opinions of average citizens, among business leaders cor-
ruption is an absolute priority. According to the people who are the driving
force of the Bulgarian economy, this is not only the most serious problem
of the country but also a problem that still has not found any solution. Such
an assessment gives rise to serious concerns because even serious topical 
problems such as crime and
political instability, are not
considered more disturbing
than corruption.
The two main indexes 
of Coalition 2000—“Corrup-
tion Pressure” and “Involve-
ment in Corruption”—pro-
vide some explanation for
these attitudes toward cor-
ruption among the general
population and business
leaders. The value of the
two indexes decreased con-
stantly, with ratings for
“pressure” and “involve-
ment” halved in mid-2002.
The 2003 data show that
both indexes retain their
levels and do not show fur-
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ther improvement. Among
business leaders both indi-
cators even show a certain
deterioration. This warrants
the assumption of a possi-
ble change in the business
environment, because the
elite is subject to much
greater corruption pressure
and is the first to register the
changes.  
A.2.2. Media Coverage of Corruption: Intensity, Topics, and
Quality
In 2003, the intensity with which corruption was covered in the media
increased constantly, reaching record levels comparable only to the spring of
2000 (Chart 8). Two main reasons may be cited for the increased interest in
the theme of corruption. The first is linked with deteriorating political stabi-
lity and the increasing criticism of the government of the country. The expe-
rience of Coalition 2000 shows that the less time remains until parliamentary
elections, the more the topic of corruption is used as a criticism of the ruling
majority. The second reason is the linking of the topic 
of corruption to crime. An increasing trend of perceiving criminal events 
as being linked with corruption has been observed since mid-2002. 
The media routinely asserts
that criminals and politi-
cians are in direct contact
(perhaps the most frequent-
ly used phrase is “high-level
patronage”).
Comparing the intensity of
the media coverage of cor-
ruption with the level of
negative public attitudes
disproves the theory that
the debate on corruption
(i.e., anticorruption rheto-
ric) makes society more
sensitive to the phenome-
non (Chart 8). Public per-
ception of the relative 
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importance of corruption is formed on the basis of a complex combination
of factors and concrete assessments, of which exposure in the media is only
one of the factors shaping these attitudes. 
One of the serious weaknesses of the Bulgarian media, according to inter-
national experts, is the fact that the problems of corruption, although cov-
ered by the regional media, are rarely picked up in the national media. The
most recent example is the failure to cover problems of local elections in
the national media: the press in Varna, Vratsa, Veliko Turnovo, Bourgas and
other big cities published numerous articles about corrupt mayoral candi-
dates, none of which were made accessible to the public in the country as
a whole.
A.2.3. Assessments of Government Anti-Corruption Efforts
Coalition 2000 utilized the opinions of groups at greatest risk of corruption—
employees in the administration and the business elite—to assess the anti-
corruption efforts of the government. The decline in confidence in the gov-
ernment, registered by public opinion polls, does not affect the assessments
of the government’s activity in countering corruption (Chart 9).
In the period after the
beginning of 2002, negative
assessments toward the
government’s efforts to
counter corruption passed
through two stages. Until
the end of 2002, attitudes
critical of the government’s
anti-corruption activity gra-
dually decreased. This was
most clearly illustrated in
the opinions gathered from
the business sector. The
most probable reason for
this positive change was 
the introduction of several
government initiatives at 
the end of 2002, such as codes of ethics in the ministries and the creation
of the Government Anticorruption Commission. The widely advertised
investigations of corruption in the system of the Ministry of Interior and the
announcement of large numbers of employees dismissed on grounds of
corruption also contributed to the more favorable assessments. In 2003 this
trend reversed, and an increase in negative assessments, especially with
regard to the measures for limiting corruption among employees in the state
administration, was registered.
A.2.4. Assessments of the Spread of Corruption 
In contrast to the indicators of the level of corruption, which reflect the
number of corruption transactions conducted over a given period of time, 
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the indicators of the spread
of corruption are based on
perceptions. The indicators
reflect different social
groups’ subjective views of
the extent to which corrup-
tion affects different spheres
of society. These percep-
tions are a combination of
practical experience of citi-
zens and their moral-politi-
cal assessments of the
degree of admissibility of
corruption. In the period of
1998-2003 (Chart 10 and
Chart 11), both among citi-
zens and among business
sector representatives, the
prevailing opinion was that
corruption was a wide-
spread and frequent prac-
tice. 
As the data show, subjec-
tive perceptions of the
spread of corruption did
not change significantly in
the period after 1998.
Practically, this means that
these types of assessments
are more of a political
nature, and that they reflect
the degree of confidence
(with regard to countering
corruption) in the executive
and, above all, the political
will of the government. This
is demonstrated by the fact
that the improvement in the values of the indicators coincides with changes
in the government (i.e., change of cabinet or replacement of cabinet mem-
bers). Besides this, it is quite clear that changes in the perceptions about the
spread of corruption and changes in public expectations related to corrup-
tion are parallel. The unfavorable level of these indicators shows that:
• Regardless of the progress made in countering corruption, its level con-
tinues to be sufficiently high to generate public distrust in the executive.
Due to this widespread perception of corruption, in their everyday expe-
rience citizens often accept even doubtful reports of corruption of
employees in the executive as worthy of attention and belief. 
• Insofar as the representatives of the business sector are concerned, the
unfavorable state of affairs diverts choices to alternative action strategies.
The latter usually lead to adaptation to the existing situation, i.e., the
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introduction of corruption transactions as an element of business strate-
gy and price formation. This is one of the reasons why the business sec-
tor regards corruption as a problem of the highest relative importance for
society.
• Often the executive’s public reactions to accusations of corruption
include surprise, taking offense, and rejection of the cases exposed by
the media and the public. In many cases, there are also counter-accusa-
tions, and demands that accusers provide proof of corrupt activities. In
such cases, both the performance and the investigating capacity are
completely controlled by the executive. Consequently, the executive is
unable to create the impression of a clear and consistently applied polit-
ical will to counter corruption. 
• As a rule, the level of the indexes measuring perceptions of the spread
of corruption is significantly higher (in a negative sense) than the level of
the indicator measuring the real level of corruption. In this sense, it is
often argued that these differences are the product of a wrong method-
ology. Such dependence is linked with the peculiarities of the measure-
ment system and with the nature of subjective perceptions. According to
public opinion, a given employee or institution is assessed as corrupt,
even if there is only one case of corruption. The halving of the number
of corrupt transactions (the trend after 2000) has not improved percep-
tions of the level of corruption. Due to the same technical type of meas-
urement, the indicators reflecting the subjective perceptions have a
much higher value than the indicators reflecting the number of corrupt
actions; however, it is important to note that these indicators measure
phenomena of a different order.
A.2.5. Main Spheres of Corruption and the Corruption Image
of Employees in the Executive, the Judiciary and the
Legislature
The opinions of the public and representatives of the business sector about
the professional groups and institutions where corruption presents a serious
problem largely overlap (Tables 3-5). What is common in the hierarchy of
distrust is the idea that corruption is present in those positions and institu-
tions of power in which the fate (social and personal) or the economic inter-
ests of citizens and business is decided. 
Throughout the year, the three spheres attracting the greatest criticism, as
well as the most contentious public debate were the customs administra-
tion, the judicial system and the system of the Ministry of Interior. In the
mind of the public and the business leaders the reputation of all three
spheres worsened (to a greater or lesser degree) with regard to the spread
of corruption. This essentially means that public trust in the basic systems of
society related to law enforcement and the administration of justice is seri-
ously shaken. For this reason, in 2003, surveys of the CMS of Coalition 2000
were carried out among three basic groups of respondents: magistrates, the
business sector, and the population. The  surveys aimed to explore the rea-
sons for the negative attitudes of the public and the factors contributing to
these negative attitudes. 
TABLE 3 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY PROFESSIONAL GROUPS 
(POPULATION SURVEY)
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors 
** Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials
Relative share of those who answered, “Nearly all and most are involved in corruption”
Apr Sep Jan Oct Jan May Oct Jan May July Oct
‘00 ’00 ’01 ’01 ’02 ’02 ’02 ’03 ‘03 ‘03 ’03
Customs officers 78,6 75,2 74,3 77,3 74,2 70,8 79,2 76,6 74,3 76,9 74,5
Police 50,5 54,3 51,0 53,7 47,0 50,7 59,6 57,7 57,7 61,4 59,2
officers
Judges 56,0 50,1 50,6 56,4 55,0 50,8 63,0 62,2 59,6 61,8 57,3
Lawyers 51,9 52,9 50,3 55,0 55,5 52,5 62,3 60,1 60,0 57,5 55,8
Prosecutors 54,4 51,3 50,7 54,8 55,4 51,0 63,0 62,1 59,3 60,6 55,7
MPs 55,1 51,7 52,6 43,5 47,8 39,2 56,2 53,5 57,5 56,9 54,5
Doctors 40,9 43,6 27,0 46,8 45,7 52,3 54,9 51,0 49,8 53,4 52,9
Ministers 53,4 55,0 52,3 41,2 45,4 35,6 50,8 49,5 52,6 54,9 52,6
Tax officials 51,0 53,7 47,3 51,6 51,2 41,9 58,0 52,6 51,8 54,1 49,3
Investigators 48,0 43,8 43,5 48,4 48,0 43,1 57,5 55,4 53,6 55,4 49,2
Businesspersons 51,4 42,3 43,6 42,2 41,6 41,4 48,9 52,7 50,9 48,7 47,6
Politicians and leaders 45,0 43,8 39,1 40,8 43,0 33,0 54,0 50,7 51,3 50,8 47,6
of political parties and
coalitions
Mayors and municipal 35,2 32,1 30,9 26,3 31,8 23,4 48,3 45,7 43,6 45,0 43,4
councilors
Ministry 55,1 49,7 43,9 45,8 47,1 36,7 48,3 44,6 44,4 45,1 40,1
officials
Bankers 38,8 33,5 35,6 32,5 31,7 29,5 37,2 43,4 35,8 37,1 37,3
Municipal 46,5 41,6 35,9 39,6 39,4 30,0 49,1 40,9 39,8 42,2 36,5
officials
University 29,3 28,1 21,6 27,4 27,7 29,8 33,4* 30,8* 31,7* 34,1* 36,5*
professors and 23,1** 20,0** 19,0** 21,2** 23,2**
officials
Administrative court 45,2 40,2 36,8 41,7 41,1 36,5 45,0 42,4 37,5 37,9 33,5
officials
NGO 18,2 23,9 18,2 19,8 21,8 15,3 21,4 20,2 21,0 21,6 22,3
representatives
Journalists 14,1 13,9 11,3 10,5 12,2 9,5 15,3 12,1 13,3 12,9 14,6
Teachers 8,2 10,9 5,8 9,3 9,7 9,8 13,9 9,8 11,6 10,9 11,0
Local political leaders 36,4 36,8 34,2 35,1 34,4 27,1 - - - - -
The following conclusions
can be drawn from the
results obtained:
• Public perceptions of the
spread of corruption are
no less harmful to insti-
tutional stability and the
effectiveness of the
economy than real man-
ifestations of corruption.
To a very large degree,
the actions of economic
agents are based on their
perceptions, due to
unlikelihood of securing
reliable information
about the real situation.
This is why anti-corrup-
tion measures of the
government should be
aimed equally strongly
both at curbing real cor-
ruption transactions and
at reducing negative per-
ceptions of corruption.
In this case the appropri-
ate strategy would be to
focus public attention on
the most important
spheres in which corrup-
tion takes place, and on
the introduction of clear
reform measures. 
• A relatively small part of
the population of the
country (about 18%)
and representatives of
the business sector
(about 19%) trust in the
possibility of the judicial
system reacting ade-
quately to emerging
problems (civic or eco-
nomic). The prevalent
opinion among the pub-
lic is that the judicial sys-
tem is slow, unreliable
and has a serious corrup-
tion problem. For these
reasons citizens and
business leaders tend
TABLE 4 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS 
(POPULATION SURVEY)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
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May Oct January May July Oct
2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003
Spead of corruption in general
In Customs. 
Among customs officers. 33,2 30,4 53,3 50,0 54,1 49,5
In court. In the judicial system.
In the system of justice.
Among lawyers. 23,5 28,5 48,2 42,9 45,3 42,0
In the system of the Ministry of  
Internal Affairs (including Traffic 
Police, the investigation service) 20,6 19,9 28,6 30,6 30,9 33,9
In the healthcare system. 
In medical care. 
In the National Health Service. 25,6 20,6 27,3 27,6 30,9 27,8
In the higher ranks of 24,7 27,6 28,5 26,1
power (Parliament, the 24,1 30,3 23,1 27,5 28,2 26,3
Presidency,the Government).
Among the political elite. 1,3 2,5 1,7 1,9
Ministries and state agencies
Ministry of Justice 12,6 10,9 31,2 31,2 31,5 32,4
Customs Agency 15,0 18,1 33,5 31,0 32,1 30,3
In all ministries 
and state agencies - - 19,6 21,8 24,6 25,4
Privatization Agency 22,0 22,5 27,2 24,7 21,8 21,7
Ministry of Internal Affairs 16,2 15,3 18,4 19,0 18,5 21,2
Judicial system
Throughout the judicial system 3,5 5,4 33,5 34,4 33,3 37,6
The courts, the administration of 
justice 29,1 32,1 27,5 29,1 32,5 30,5
Prosecution 26,2 32,0 26,2 25,3 30,0 22,9
Lawyers 15,3 16,2 24,9 21,8 22,5 19,7
Notaries public 7,4 8,0 7,4 8,5
Criminal Investigation service 15,7 15,7 18,4 17,6 21,5 15,3
either not to use the
services of the judicial
system or to solve their
problems in alternative
ways.
The study conducted
among 454 magistrates3
shows that the professional
community in the judicial
system has a clear idea of
the problems in the struc-
ture and functioning of the
system. Furthermore, the
magistrates admit that cor-
ruption has not left the judi-
cial system itself unaffected
(see Chart 13). In this
respect, from the viewpoint
of the magistrates, the prob-
lem is perceived as less
acute than from the view-
point of the population and
the business elite. 
Regardless of the fact that
the magistrates are less crit-
ical of themselves than of
their colleagues, the data
from the survey clearly illus-
trate the use of corruption
transactions to influence
the course and results of the
investigation and trial. A
total of about 4-6% of the
magistrates note that no
cases of corruption exist 
among judges, prosecutors and investigators, and a total of about 9-13% of
the magistrates find it difficult to assess to what extent cases of corruption
occur in the judiciary. The remaining cases (75-80%) clearly reveal the main
corruption interests related to the functioning of the judiciary (Table 6). 
Corruption in the judiciary undermines its effectiveness and its ability to
perform its functions as established in the constitution. The lack of trust in
the objectivity and justice of the judiciary in turn greatly hampers and rais-
es the cost of economic transactions and increases the business risk in the
country. Competition between economic actors is distorted into unfair
TABLE 5 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS 
(BUSINESS-SECTOR SURVEY)*
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Base: All respondents
* The percentages add up to more than 100 because respondents could give up to three answers.
March June November
2003 2003 2003
In customs, among customs officers 62,4 59,5 55,6
In the judicial system 36,7 36,4 32,1
Ministry of Internal Affairs and its agencies 20,4 24,9 27,8
In the National Assembly / among MPs 24,2 19,5 20,7
Government, ministers 20,1 19,2 18,5
In healthcare 18,3 17,9 16,6
In the agencies issuing various permits and certificates
(Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, etc.) 22,1 20,6 16,2
In central public administration 12,8 13,3 13,3
In municipal administrations 17,4 17,0 12,4
In the tax system 12,1 17,0 10,7
In big business 13,0 8,4 9,3
In the education system 2,5 1,4 3,3
In the presidency 0,9 0,7 0,2
Everywhere 6,3 8,6 14,3
Other 0,4 0,2 1,9
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3 The survey Corruption and Anti-Corruption: The Viewpoint of Magistrates was conducted by Vitosha
Research in the period April 21- May 20, 2003 within the framework of the CMS of Coalition
2000. This is the first survey of its type on the problems of corruption in the judiciary, in which
the respondents are the very representatives of the judiciary—judges, prosecutors and investi-
gators.
business practices and the
striving for a politically-secu-
red monopoly. The con-
tracts in the official economy
are fewer and short-term
ones, and the companies
have limited growth op-
portunities. Furthermore,
although losses of the
increased risk for the eco-
nomy cannot be measured
accurately due to the influ-
ence of additional factors,
the removal of the corrup-
tion burden in the judiciary
will probably have a strong
positive economic effect in
the long run. The distrust of
citizens in the judiciary is
even stronger than the dis-
trust of business. The rea-
sons should be sought both
in the media coverage of
the inter-institutional con-
flicts of the judiciary and
the executive, as well as in
the relative inaccessibility of
judicial institutions to citi-
zens from a financial and
instructive viewpoint.
It should be noted that both
in business circles and
among citizens, it is of little
consequence whether atti-
tudes toward the judiciary
rest on practical experience
or on perception. In either
case the negative image of 
the judiciary delays the development of democratic institutions of the mar-
ket and reduces the desire and willingness of society to support new
reforms. This is why anti-corruption efforts should aim both at the solution
of concrete practical problems, and at the general improvement of the pub-
lic attitude toward the judiciary. 
The behavior of the professional community in the judiciary does not
always match the nature and the urgency of the problems (including the
problem of corruption), with which only this community could cope (due
to its constitutionally defined independence). The statements and actions
of many magistrates are dominated by a defensive reaction—denial of the
problems or attempts to shift them to other institutions. The lack of self-
criticism in combination with the stronger criticism of the other parts of
society often places the public and business in a deadlock—on the one
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hand only the professional
community in the judiciary
is able to propose alterna-
tives and solutions of the
problems and, on the
other, the professional
community relatively rarely
makes an attempt to con-
vince society with words
and action that it is actually
looking for solutions to
making the judiciary serve
the public interest more
effectively. 
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TABLE 6 TARGETS OF CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS FOR 
DIFFERENT GROUPS OF MAGISTRATES (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Judges
To render a verdict/judgement with a predetermined content 69.6
To dismiss / suspend action without legal grounds 39.6
To delay the hearing of a case 40.1
To protract, accelerate or influence in another way entry into 
the commercial register 27.5
To exert undue influence 15.4
Other 1.5
No corruption act is taken 4.6
Don’t know/ No answer 9.5
Public prosecutors
To cancel criminal proceedings 63.4
To start/not start pre-trial proceedings or 
preliminary examination 49.3
To submit/not submit  a bill of indictment 27.8
To remand a case for further investigation without legal grounds 23.3
Not to exercise procedural action in cases when they 
are obliged to 19.8
To exert undue influence 17.0
Other 1.5
No corruption act is taken 4.6
Don’t know/ No answer 12.3
Investigators
To take or not take up certain actions 
of investigation 59.5
To stop investigation or propose 
its termination 56.2
To exert undue influence 28.0
Other 2.2
No corruption act is taken 6.2
Don’t know/ No answer 13.2
Because of its specific functions and peculiar place within the system of
state power, the judiciary is given a paramount role in promoting the rule
of law, protecting fundamental rights, and efficiently suppressing corrup-
tion—a major problem of the transition period that is still to be resolved.
The key branches of the judiciary are called upon to investigate, prosecute
and impose penalties for crimes of corruption. Any failure to fulfill, or fulfill
on time, those functions therefore perturbs public confidence in the judici-
ary. Even worse, the existence of corruption with the judiciary brings harm
to society and the state as it distorts the very nature of the judicial system
and prevents it from exercising the functions vested in it by the Constitution
and by the laws, namely to uphold the rights and the lawful interests of cit-
izens, legal entities and the State.
Public opinion polls in 2003 suggest that, just like in previous years, there is
a high level of corruption in the judiciary. Contrary to the polls, every other
magistrate is confident that public perceptions of the spread of corruption
are unfounded.
Moreover, a disturbing trend has been perceived within the judiciary in that
the bodies of the system deny responsibility and blame each other for the
spread of corruption, thus revealing the existence of serious flaws in the
understanding of the place and role of the different branches, and in their
mutual relations.
The trend to impute corrup-
tion to a branch of the judi-
ciary other than one’s own
is also visible from magis-
trates’ perceptions of the
stages of criminal and civil
proceedings. One out of
four judges states that cor-
ruption is most widespread
at the stage of preliminary
proceedings, and one out of
five judges believes the
same about police investi-
gation. Quite the contrary,
prosecutors and investiga-
tors identify the court stage
as the key segment of crim-
inal proceedings where cor-
ruption transaction abound.
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The lack of specific statisti-
cal data makes it impossible
to map out the real picture
of the number of cases
where magistrates have
been investigated, prose-
cuted or punished for cor-
rupt crimes. Nonetheless,
given the constitutional
principle of full immunity
that existed until recently
and the extremely rare
requests and decisions to
lift the immunity of particu-
lar magistrates, it seems jus-
tified to conclude that there 
has been almost no instance of detecting and prosecuting corruption
offenses perpetrated by members of the judiciary.4
Any evaluation of the state of affairs in the judiciary, the level of corruption
therein and the contribution of that branch to the fight against corruption in
2003, must take account of some essential factors of domestic and interna-
tional politics that bear directly on judicial reform.
Firstly, one must consider the consensus reached by all political forces rep-
resented in Parliament on the priorities of judicial reform, as manifested
in the Declaration on the Guidelines to Reform the Bulgarian Judicial System
signed by those forces on April 2, 2003. Despite the incomplete inventory
of issues addressed there,
the declaration is a good
point of departure in the
search of genuine, wider
consensus on the way to
attaining the stated objec-
tives of judicial reform.
Secondly, one must consid-
er the amendments to
Chapter Six of the Consti-
tution, enacted on Septem-
ber 24, 2003, which repre-
sented the first steps in
breaking through the obvi-
ously malfunctioning frame-
work and removing the
obstacles to serious legisla-
tive change with respect to 
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4 The Report on the Activity of the Supreme Judicial Council in the period December  16, 1998-
December 16, 2003 states that during its five-year term of office, the Supreme Judicial Council
has decided to lifting the immunity of seven magistrates, of which six are investigators at District
Investigation Services and one is a military investigator, and has rejected the requests for lifting
immunity in four cases concerning one judge, one prosecutor and two investigators.
TABLE 7 ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION WITHIN
THE THREE GROUPS OF MAGISTRATES (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
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CHART 15 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION WITHIN DIFFERENT
GROUPS OF MAGISTRATES (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Corruption proliferated among:
(relative share of responses 
“Most or all magistrates are involved“)
Magistrate Judges Prosecutors Investigators
1. Judge 2.8 17.4 19.0
2. Prosecutor 11.9 7.9 10.3
3. Investigator 20.8 28.2 4.7
the judiciary erected by the Constitutional Court. Despite the unanimous
passage of those amendments, however, their significance should not be
overstated. Parliament confined its debate on the Constitution solely to the
requirements imposed from abroad in the context of Bulgaria’s EU acces-
sion negotiations. It therefore failed to pave the way for large-scale modifi-
cations that would be feasible in the context of Judgment No. 3 of the
Constitutional Court of April 10, 2003 (Constitutional Case No. 22 of 2002),
such as introducing mechanisms that ensure the accountability of the
branches and bodies of the judiciary, particularly the prosecutor general, or
putting in place “independent counsel”, an official outside the system of the
public prosecution and vested by law with the investigation of corruption
inside the judiciary. Some of the possible and required changes that already
enjoy public and political support, though they are not directly connected
with the judiciary, can substantially relieve the work of that branch of
power, improve the protection of human rights and restrict the channels
whereby corruption is infused into the judicial bodies and into other state
institutions. Those changes include inter alia the enactment of constitution-
al rules on an ombudsperson (including provisions on his or her election by
a qualified majority and on his or her right to refer issues to the
Constitutional Court), the establishment of alternative dispute-resolution
techniques, and the imposition of stricter duties on attorneys to comply
with professional ethics and discipline.
Thirdly, one must take into account the closure of Chapter 24, Justice and
Home Affairs, of Bulgaria’s pre-accession negotiations with the European
Commission on October 29, 2003. The closure of that chapter by no means
signifies that judicial reform has come to an end, nor that the issue of cor-
ruption has finally been settled. Further progress in reforming the judiciary
will greatly predetermine Bulgaria’s successful accession to NATO and the
European Union and its future membership of those organizations. The
European criteria for a well-functioning judicial system remain stringent and
imply specific requirements subject to regular compliance reports to the
European Commission. If the problems under Chapter 24 fail to be resolved
within the time limits agreed, negotiations in this area may therefore be
resumed under the existing safeguard clause. According to the agreement
reached under Chapter 24, reforms are still needed in the areas of:
• improving access to justice;
• drawing a clear divide between the tasks and responsibilities of the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and the Ministry of Justice;
• bringing the budget of the judiciary in accordance with European stan-
dards;
• creating an objective and transparent case-assignment procedure;
• introducing uniform statistics for all branches and bodies of the judiciary;
• reorganizing the system of investigation, etc.
Irrespective of the discrepant evaluations of the result attained, each of the
above factors will be important to the future development and scope of
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 27
judicial reforms. The analysis of the long-standing practice of piecemeal
reforms and the lack of satisfactory results made it clear in 2003 that a com-
prehensive consensus-based approach is needed which touches upon all
future constitutional, legislative, organizational and institutional reforms.
Achieving such a consensus on as many key issues of judicial reform as pos-
sible is a must for legal certainty and institutional stability, and for public
trust in the judicial bodies. It is also a sine qua non if we are to bring to an
end the typical transitional process of replacing the independent, profes-
sional decisions and steps of magistrates with acts inspired by politics or cor-
ruption, and to do away with inter-institutional conflicts, including those
between the separate branches of the judiciary. Future consensus-based
amendments to the Constitution should provide a framework for the sepa-
ration of and balance between the powers where the Constitutional Court
acts primarily as a guardian of the constitutional consensus, and should
leave a much narrower space for interpretation, sometimes doubtful and
partial, of the constitutional norms or for interpretation that may compro-
mise the supremacy of the legislative power.
Building future judicial reforms on the basis of consensus would improve
the situation in the country, and the judiciary in particular, in terms of lim-
iting corruption.
A comprehensive approach to the organization of the judiciary is a prereq-
uisite for attaining a functioning, solid, independent and corruption-free
judicial power, as well as for an efficient fight against corruption in society.
Relevant legal and institutional solutions are needed for the fundamental
elements of the organization of the judiciary, viz. the principles upon which
it is based and operates, its management and structure, and the relations
between its branches. The general aspects of the structure, principles and
functions of the judiciary which define its place under the separation of
powers must be governed by the Constitution, while the details should be
fixed in the legislation adopted on the basis of the respective constitu-
tional arrangements. At the same time, issues such as introducing time and
quality standards, achieving the required transparent and open perform-
ance of the judiciary, adopting effective anti-corruption measures in gener-
al, and in the branches of the judiciary in particular, improving the criteria
for recruiting professionals and regularly evaluating their performance,
improving the efficiency of disciplinary proceedings against magistrates,
etc., could be resolved even within the current constitutional framework,
and specific steps have been undertaken to that effect.
B.1.1. Fundamental Principles Underlying the Organization
and Operation of the Judiciary
The principles that govern the organization and operation of the judiciary have
been prominently on the agenda of the debates on judicial reform in recent
years. Specific proposals and recommendations, especially those suggesting:
• to rethink the issue of independence and irremovability,
• to limit the immunity of magistrates,
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B.1. The Organization of 
the Judiciary: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and 
Institutional 
Aspects
• to introduce terms of office for magistrates in managerial positions, 
can be found in the basic papers produced by a number of influential inter-
national organizations and institutions, and by some national civic organi-
zations and initiatives.5
The amendments to the constitutional rules on the judiciary enacted in
2003 have produced the following changes:
First, the immunity of magistrates has been narrowed down to functional
immunity, i.e., magistrates shall be immune from criminal or civil liability
only for actions undertaken in their official capacity (as opposed to liability
ensuing from their private endeavors and actions outside the context of
their direct activities). Immunity also extends to the orders and judgments
of magistrates, unless the act in question represents an intentional offense
prosecuted on indictment. In the latter case magistrates can only be prose-
cuted with the authorization of the Supreme Judicial Council. Judges, pros-
ecutors and investigators may be arrested only for serious offenses, and only
after the Supreme Judicial Council has so authorized. No authorization is
required if the magistrate is caught at the scene of a serious crime.
Authorization to lift the immunity of a magistrate may be sought by the
prosecutor general or by at least one fifth of the members of the Supreme
Judicial Council, provided that the request is reasonable.
Second, the changes in the principle of irremovability of magistrates con-
cern the time that has to lapse before a magistrate becomes irremovable,
the procedure applicable to the acquisition of that status, and the grounds
for early dismissal of magistrates who are otherwise irremovable. The status
of irremovability shall be acquired with the completion of five years of work
as a judge, prosecutor or investigator, and with evaluation of past perform-
ance. The grounds to dismiss irremovable magistrates, including the presi-
dents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative
Court, and the prosecutor general, now include inter alia “serious breach of,
or systematic failure to, fulfill official duties, as well as any act that under-
mines the reputation of the judiciary”.
Third, terms of office have become a principle applicable to the magis-
trates holding managerial positions at the bodies of the judiciary (save for
the president of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the president of the
Supreme Administrative Court, and the prosecutor general for whom the 
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5 For instance: The annual regular reports of the European Commission; the Evaluation Report
(2002) adopted by the Group of State Against Corruption (GRECO) within the framework of the
first evaluation round of GRECO; the Evaluation Report of the Working Group On Bribery in
International Business Transactions at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) adopted in February 2003 within phase two of the monitoring process of
the implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions and the Revised  Recommendation of the Council on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (1997); the reports of the EU Accession
Monitoring Program of the Open Society Institute–Budapest on the capacity of the judiciary in
accession countries; research by the Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank, especially
with respect to legal and judicial reforms and the suppression of corruption; the Judicial Reform
Index developed by the Central and Eurasian Law Initiative of the American Bar Association
(ABA-CEELI); and previous Corruption Assessment Reports by Coalition 2000.
status quo has been maintained). The term of office is five years, and may be
renewed. The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary currently in the
pipeline suggest that the nomination of candidates for such positions (by the
immediate superiors or by one fifth of SJC members) and their appointment
should take place by March 31, 2004. Regular replacement of the heads of
judicial bodies would circumscribe the possibilities of improper personal
relations or enduring corruption transactions.
Because these partial amendments were passed before certain other indis-
pensable reforms in the judiciary, the following problems may be envisaged
in the course of their implementation:
• The reform of magistrates’ immunity has left almost intact the powers of
the prosecutor general, as the proposal to introduce independent coun-
sel (a public official endowed by law with prosecutorial functions to seek
the lifting of a magistrate’s immunity or, where appropriate, to institute
preliminary proceedings and guide the investigation) was dropped. The
new possibility for one fifth of SJC members to authorize the arrest of a
magistrate caught on the scene of a serious crime, or to authorize the
prosecution of a magistrate, is not a sufficient corrective to the monop-
oly the prosecutor general has on the prosecutorial function and on
investigation. The realization of the criminal liability of magistrates there-
fore remains almost entirely dependent on the subjective view of the
prosecutor general, as long as the unified and centralized structure of
public prosecution is preserved.
• In addition, the new ground to dismiss irremovable magistrates (“serious
breach of, or systematic failure to fulfill official duties, as well as any act
that undermines the reputation of the judiciary”) is worded in a fairly
general fashion and can hardly be implemented in practice. In particu-
lar it is not clear who, and based on what criteria, would make the judg-
ment of whether the conduct of a magistrate has undermined the repu-
tation of the judiciary or does not play by the “rules”. 
• Likewise, one should think of the possible risks of improper pressure and
instability when the modified principles are applied against the backdrop
of other major lingering problems of the judiciary, e.g., the overgrown
independence of the judiciary that borders on a total lack of control, the
distorted balance of powers, the lack of guarantees to prevent self-insula-
tion of the system or its improper involvement in political or corporate
interests, the persistent lack of accountability of the prosecutor general and
the centralized hierarchical structure of the system of prosecution, the
problems surrounding the composition of the SJC and the required adjust-
ment of its functions, etc. For example, unless the limited immunity of mag-
istrates is accompanied by thorough guarantees and well-thought-out pro-
cedures and mechanisms, it could actually produce opposite effects, e.g.,
unfounded persecution, pressure, defamation, frustration of justice and
investigation, etc. It is therefore worth analyzing the opinion of magistrates
as most of them (49.3%) believe that a move to functional immunity would
not in itself reduce corruption in the judiciary, compared to 37.2% in sup-
port of the idea and 13.4% without an opinion on the matter.6
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• Even in their most current form, the above organizational principles
reproduce the current structural problems of the judiciary. Those princi-
ples are applicable to all three branches (courts, public prosecution, and
investigation) and no account is taken of the different professional cir-
cumstances of judges, prosecutors and investigators which derive from
their different functions, powers and hierarchical dependence, from the
different transparency, recruitment policy, appointment and career pro-
motion arrangements in the three branches. As a result, it is still neces-
sary to create a legal possibility to apply the major principles in a differ-
entiated manner within the current structure of the judiciary, especially
given that structural changes may take place in the future.
• As a matter of fact, the implementation of the terms of office will be in
the hands of the new Supreme Judicial Council, elected in December
2003, that is formed under the existing quota-based scheme. That pro-
cedure, particularly the election of the parliamentary quota by a simple
majority, largely predetermines the replacement of one politically-shad-
ed team of SJC members with another, and, hence, the key role of the
ruling majority or coalition in the appointments of the heads of courts,
prosecution offices and investigation services as well as in the making of
other important decisions concerning the judiciary. Another risk that
should be taken into account lies in the possibility members of the SJC,
elected by the judicial quota but representing different branches of the
judiciary, to defend positions that are predetermined by the institution
they represent, sometimes even opposing each other. All this would
additionally hamper the formation of a uniform and impartial position
by the SJC members. 
To attain the principal objectives of judicial reform—accountability, swiftness,
and efficiency—and to suppress corruption more successfully, further consti-
tutional and statutory amendments are needed that preserve the independ-
ence of the judiciary, while allowing for a better balance between the branch-
es of power, wider transparency and responsibility across the judicial system,
and ampler room for civil control. These could be summarized as follows:
First, the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary should
be kept. Nonetheless, it should not be an end in itself or amount to irre-
sponsibility. It should rather serve as a precondition for the full-fledged ful-
fillment of the tasks of the judiciary, to ensure lawfulness and fairness, to
uphold the laws and protect legal rights. In other words, lucid mechanisms
of mutual control (checks and balances) of the three powers should be
introduced. The lack of such mechanisms in the existing system, including
its constitutional framework, is one of the reasons why independence is
sometimes perceived as untouchability. Therefore, the purpose of the pro-
posed options (i.e., to change the management and the structure of the
judiciary, of the public prosecution and investigation, to make their powers
more specific, and to redefine their fundamental organizational principles)
is to prevent the threats of concentrating too much power in the same
hands and the risk of abuse, while ensuring a balance of powers that essen-
tially respects the principle of independence. 
Second, the independence of the judiciary should be more closely linked
to the principle of separation of powers and the ensuing relationships
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among those powers. In that context, it is suggested that an amendment to
the Constitution be considered that would provide that the president of the
Supreme Court of Cassation, the president of the Supreme
Administrative Court and the prosecutor general shall be elected by the
National Assembly for a term of office of at least five years, and with a qual-
ified majority in order to avoid politicizing the election. The National
Assembly should have the power to decide on the early removal of those
individuals from office and on lifting their immunity, though solely on con-
ditions, and under a procedure strictly defined in the Constitution. The
National Assembly could thus play a vital part in ensuring the checks and
balances among the three powers, without interfering with the independ-
ence of the judiciary.
Third, the status and structure of public prosecution is an issue essential to
the independence of the judiciary in the context of the separation of powers.
While magistrates have dia-
metrically opposing views
on whether the existing uni-
form and centralized struc-
ture of public prosecution is
conducive to corruption,
the opinion that specific
measures are needed to
ensure the decentraliza-
tion, transparency and ac-
countability of that system
seems to be gaining ground.
Moreover, such measures
are actually feasible within
the current constitutional
framework and could be
pursued by amending and
supplementing the Law on
the Judiciary. Possible meas-
ures include:
• changing the hierarchi-
cal model on which the
system of prosecution is
based;
• providing better guaran-
tees for the independ-
ence of prosecutors of
any superior prosecutor
or of the administrative
head of the prosecution 
system when deciding on specific files and cases. This can be achieved
by introducing a requirement for written instructions, and by recogniz-
ing the right of prosecutors to object against the instructions given by
superior prosecutors or to step out of the case in the event of disagree-
ment with the instructions received;
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TABLE 9 “DOES THE EXISTING UNIFIED AND CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC 
PROSECUTION IMPACT THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE PROSECUTION?”
(BY CATEGORY OF MAGISTRATES) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree Does not know/ 
agree disagree No response
Judge 26.3 29.1 27.4 8.4 8.9
Prosecutor 5.6 10.3 30.2 50.0 4.0
Investigator 26.2 31.5 24.2 9.4 8.7
TABLE 8 “DOES THE EXISTING UNIFIED AND CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC 
PROSECUTION IMPACT THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE PROSECUTION?”
(ACCORDING TO MAGISTRATES) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Agree 20.5
Somewhat agree 24.7
Somewhat disagree 27.1
Disagree 20.3
Does not know/No response 7.5
• prescribing serious sanctions to root out the unlawful practice of giving
oral instructions;
• introducing (i.e., in the Constitution) the principle of regular and ad hoc
reporting by the prosecutor general to the SJC or to the National
Assembly, respectively (depending on whether the proposal for the pros-
ecutor general to be elected by Parliament is approved).
Fourth, the adjustments to be sought through constitutional amendments
also comprise the possible appointment of a public official entrusted by
law with prosecutorial functions, or of a team of such officials, outside the
hierarchical system of public prosecution in its current form. Such officials
should be elected by the National Assembly to fulfill specific functions (e.g.,
to investigate instances of inside corruption in the judiciary) or ad hoc, and
should enjoy the immunity of magistrates. Their powers should extend to
investigating, pressing charges and maintaining the indictment in cases
expressly envisaged in the Constitution.
Fifth, with regard to immunity, the future constitutional solution should be
based on a general review of the immunity provided to a wider spectrum of
individuals (members of Parliament, members of the Constitutional Court,
and individuals in senior positions in the executive).
Sixth, the Constitution should lay down the general parameters, the content
of and the correctives to irremovability, and these should be specified in the
legislation by defining clear criteria and rules, along with specific conditions
for obtaining or losing the status of irremovability. It is proposed that irre-
movability should only benefit magistrates who work effectively in the
authorities of the judiciary  (in other words, it should not apply where those
individuals occupy elected positions such as members of Parliament or
mayors, or if they are on leave).
Seventh, it is worthwhile to consider the proposal to introduce a special
procedure for an early removal from office that should be developed on
substantive grounds defined in the Constitution.
Eighth, special attention should be given to the hierarchical relations inside
the different systems: superior magistrates should control and monitor mag-
istrates at lower levels only by way of providing general methodological
guidance and without any interference in the resolution of cases, let alone
unlawful pressure from top to bottom.
B.1.2. Managing the Judiciary
To effectively combat corruption, the management of the judiciary should
be professional and resistant to corruption. Likewise, the functions and the
powers of the Supreme Judicial Council, as a body of the judiciary, and of
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), as an executive authority, must be distin-
guished and redefined, while putting in place a reliable framework of inter-
action between these two players.
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The powers of the SJC should focus on the general strategic management
and organization of the judiciary’s staffing policy (including recruitment,
evaluation, acquisition and loss of the status of irremovability by magis-
trates, and budgeting for the judiciary, especially in the context of staffing
policy). Any extension beyond that remit may well entail a duplication in
the functions of the SJC and the Ministry of Justice and may ultimately make
one of the two institutions redundant.
As for the suppression of corruption, it is particularly pertinent for the SJC to
receive and exercise to the fullest extent the power to introduce standards
on how the work performed by the branches of the judiciary would be
reported and uniform statistical reporting forms to be used by all bodies and
branches of the system, as well as to summarize statistical data. This would
put an end to the provision of discrepant information by courts, prosecution
offices and investigation services, and would foster an objective assessment
of the level of corruption and of the genuine effect of anti-corruption
efforts. Moreover, in view of Bulgaria’s future accession to the European
Union, as of 2004 the country should provide the European Commission
with regular information on criminal proceedings, charges pressed, and
convictions in respect to organized crime, corruption, drugs, trafficking
in persons, and tax and financial offenses.
Enhancing the independence of the judiciary would also mean confining
the managerial powers of the executive (i.e., the Ministry of Justice) vis-‡-
vis the judiciary to providing the organization and the facilities indispensa-
ble for the effective operation of judicial bodies (management and mainte-
nance of buildings; provision of equipment and materials; provision of
security staff and facilities, as well as assisting with the additional training of
magistrates and staff; checking on the progress of cases or any unjustified
delays; unwarranted remittals and the like, while refraining from any inter-
ference with the merits of the cases, etc.).
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the budget of the judi-
ciary is a major cause for friction between the judiciary and the executive
and this will persist, unless European standards in that respect are applied
(the budget should amount to 4% of GDP, while in 2003 it was less than
1% in Bulgaria). Besides increased allocations from the national budget,
additional funding must be ensured for judicial reforms. It is within the
powers of the SJC to encourage a broader involvement in international and
European projects and the active utilization of EU pre-accession funds.
Further measures to help the SJC exercise its powers
• Put in place a well-developed system of rules and regulations on
the operation and management of the judiciary, including anti-
corruption norms.
• Improve the internal rules on the proceedings of the SJC, includ-
ing its decision-making procedures.
• Develop an information system to ensure co-ordination and con-
trol, by introducing uniform judicial statistics.
• Detail the SJC’s powers to discipline magistrates, and ensure the
full-fledged exercise of those powers.
• Promote the openness and transparency of the SJC’s work by
implementing and refining the existing media strategy.
• Establish dialogue and co-operation with the executive and the
legislature, especially in view of resolving the problems of the judi-
ciary.
The prevailing number of magistrates (61.2%) recognize the need for
reforms in the SJC that would make it more efficient in combating corrup-
tion in the judiciary. Some of the indispensable changes that have been
identified concern the way in which the SJC is composed, including the
abolition of the parliamentary quota, the promotion of wider transparency
and openness in the work of the SJC, the extension of its powers and capac-
ity in disciplinary proceedings, the implementation of a system of control
and coordination, etc.
The possible changes in the status of the SJC, its powers and formation
(number of members, election and term of office, eligibility criteria) must be
effected through the Constitution and should be carefully linked to possible
future changes in the structure of the judiciary. Along these lines, it is worth
noting and examining in depth the suggestion that SJC members be elect-
ed solely by the bodies of the judiciary and those bodies nominate a
member of the judiciary as president of the SJC. The latter should be elect-
ed by the National Assembly and report thereto regularly or ad hoc.
That structure matches the
proposal to have the presi-
dent of the Supreme Court
of Cassation, the president of
the Supreme Administrative
Court, and the prosecutor
general elected by the Na-
tional Assembly. This would
indeed deprive the assembly
from having a say in the
composition of the SJC but
the parliament would still
have its role in operating the
mutual checks and balances
among the three powers. 
It is suggested that, should
the parliamentary quota
persist, the elections should
be by a qualified majority.
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TABLE 10 “WHAT ARE THE REFORMS NEEDED BY 
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL?”
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Yes (%)
Changing the manner of forming the SJC 60.8
Promoting a more transparent and open operation of the SJC 54.0
Extending the SJC’s powers/enhancing its capacity in disciplinary 
proceedings against magistrates 37.4
Strengthening the SJC’s administrative and managerial capacity 19.1
Building up a control and coordination information system 48.2
Other 4.3
Does not know/no response 0.0
B.1.3. Anti-Corruption Measures Designed to Promote the
Status of Magistrates
The status of magistrates largely conditions their conduct in the process of
combating corruption, both in their capacity as representatives of the bod-
ies in charge of investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes, and in their
possible capacity to be corruption offenders. The previous measures to pro-
mote the status of magistrates have failed to take account of the different
functions and powers of judges, prosecutors and investigators. There has
even been no debate about any differentiated legislative solutions, and
these would be essential if the investigation and/or the prosecution were to
move from the judiciary to the executive.
In spite of the difficulties inherent in the uniform status of judges, prose-
cutors and investigators under the current constitutional framework of
the judiciary, a vast number of magistrates share the need for compre-
hensive measures to pro-
mote the status of magis-
trates so as to reduce the
possibilities for any form of
corruption, e.g., introduc-
ing stricter criteria for the
recruitment and appoint-
ment of magistrates,
improving the devices
used to monitor their per-
formance and the proce-
dures of disciplining magis-
trates, by providing sum-
mary procedures for some
cases, adjusting the rele-
vant powers of the SJC,
refining access to the pro-
fession of magistrates, and
making competitions for
such access dependent on
clear criteria that preclude
any improper acts.
In addition to the above findings, attention should be paid to the following
aspects:
• Selection and appointment criteria applicable to magistrates
The staffing policy in the judiciary needs to be seriously reformed – as
regards both the initial election of magistrates and their promotion in the
same position or hierarchically, while ensuring a more balanced represen-
tation of both genders within the community of magistrates. The current
widespread approach where the presidents of the respective courts or pros-
ecution offices make a sole proposal (i.e., submit a single nomination) more
often than not results in subjectivity, lobby pressures and other forms of
improper influence.
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TABLE 11 MEASURES TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO CURB CORRUPTION WITHIN THE JUDICIARY
(ACCORDING TO MAGISTRATES)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Agree (%)
Increasing the salaries of magistrates/court staff members 69.4
Introducing more stringent criteria for the selection of magistrates 68.7
Making changes in the structure of the judiciary and providing wider 
opportunities for accountability, monitoring and disciplining 35.0
Introducing regular evaluations of professional performance and linking 
magistrates’ career development with the result of such evaluations 32.8
Introducing an efficient system to improve the professional qualification of 
magistrates 33.9
Encouraging magistrates to report to the public on any deficiencies in 
judicial work they have come across 25.1
Other 4.4
Does not know/No response 0.7
The principle of competition should be the only one utilized when a mag-
istrate is to take a position at a higher instance or to be moved to another
job or another town. The first step to that effect was the first centralized
competition for junior judges held at the end of 2002 on the grounds of the
Interim Regulations issued by the SJC. Ordinance No. 1 Laying Down the
Conditions and Procedure for Carrying out Competitions for Magistrates, adopt-
ed by the SJC (in effect as of April 23, 2003, amended on December 3,
2003), provides that every applicant for a magistrate’s position should sit for
a written and oral exam; these requirements should be abided by consis-
tently and objectively. As regards the competitions for becoming a member
of the judiciary and the evaluations of magistrates before they become irre-
movable or are promoted in rank or in position, it is essential for the SJC to
organize and monitor the rigorous and corruption-free implementation of
the new rules. Otherwise they would be pointless and only serve as a shell
for reform.
Applicants for the judiciary should undergo a careful scrutiny for, among
other things, their mental fitness and character so that different forms of
dependence or negative factors (suggestibility, instability, etc.) could be dis-
qualifying. The existence of any kinship or other connections or interests
should also be taken into consideration where it is likely to generate a con-
flict of interests or any privilege.
• Mechanisms to control the performance of magistrates
Since the efficient administration of justice depends to the utmost extent on
the competence and professionalism of magistrates, their performance
should be monitored. The review of court acts by higher powers is not suf-
ficient to achieve a lasting improvement of the system of justice or to ensure
the integrity and professionalism of magistrates.
It is necessary to expand the rules on evaluation that were introduced by
the 2002 amendments to the Law on the Judiciary and reconfirmed by the
new wording of §129(3) of the Constitution. To that effect, a permanent body
should be set up with the SJC (an Evaluation Commission) that would assess
the work of magistrates regularly (every other year), upon the expiry of the
term for obtaining guaranteed tenure, and upon any proposed promotion
in rank or in salary or in position. The composition of that commission
(number of members, which professional groups they should belong to,
etc.), and the mechanism for its formation that would guarantee its inde-
pendence, must be given a solid legislative basis.
All of the decisions concerning the professional career of magistrates,
including their evaluation, should rely on the objective criteria listed in the
Law on the Judiciary. Recommendation No. R(1994)12 of the Committee of
Ministers to the Member States of the Council of Europe on the independence, effi-
ciency and role of judges of October 13, 1994 suggests the same approach. The
Law on the Judiciary should include the following indicators to be used as
evaluation criteria for the magistrates:
– Competence. This should cover elements such as quality of perform-
ance, number of cases closed, and promptness.
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– Honesty and integrity.
– Experience, based on the length of professional service and on qual-
ifications.
– Willingness to improve one’s professional knowledge and skills by
way of additional specialized training.
It is necessary to bring the rules on professional ethics, which have been
or are to be adopted by the professional organizations of magistrates and
approved by the SJC, closer to the requirements for professionalism and to
the definition of offenses and the statutory mechanisms for monitoring and
disciplining. This is a must for the enforcement of the novel provision of the
Law on the Judiciary (§ 168(1)(3)) under which magistrates shall be disciplined
for their breach of the moral rules embedded in the applicable Ethics Code.
According to the polls among magistrates, 46.7% of them think that the
adoption of and compliance with ethics codes would lessen corruption in
the judiciary.7
• Education and training of magistrates
The lack of a serious reform of legal education and the deficient efforts to
improve the professional skills of judges, prosecutors and investigators form
a major reason for the insufficient capacity of the judiciary to perform its
basic functions, in particular, to suppress corruption. The quality of educa-
tion largely defines whether the young people appointed or to be appoint-
ed in the judicial bodies now, would successfully implement the expected
judicial reforms and add more professionalism and moral integrity to the
fight against corruption. The training of practicing magistrates grows in
importance along with the need to ensure the future enforcement of
European Union law. Therefore, material improvements should be made of
university education, and of the initial training (including the practical train-
ing) before new magistrates take office, as well as of on-the-job training
which should take place on a continuous basis throughout magistrates’ pro-
fessional lives.
First, as regards higher education, it is necessary to upgrade the link
between theory and practice in the process of teaching by involving emi-
nent magistrates; the seminars should rather serve to equip the students
with practical knowledge and skills by way of methods such as moot court
exercises and the drafting of warrants, indictments, criminal and civil judg-
ments, and rulings. The apprenticeship periods in the course of university
studies should become more efficient and there should be closer links
between law schools and the institutions where apprentices are placed.
Second, as regards the practical training of apprentice-lawyers, an altered
duration of apprenticeship will hardly be successful on its own8. As a mat-
ter of fact, apprenticeships should be given a completely new basis by 
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8 The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary made in 2002 and furthered by the amendments of
July 2003 shortened the time of compulsory apprenticeship from one year to three months,
which would hardly enhance the knowledge or the skills of future magistrates.
amending the legal rules that govern the procedure and conditions for
becoming a qualified lawyer. These should be coupled with the introduc-
tion of additional, practice-oriented training for future judges, prosecu-
tors, investigators, notaries, bailiffs, real estate registration judges or mem-
bers of other professions.
Third, to meet the need to continuously improve the professional quali-
fications of practicing judges, prosecutors and investigators, account should
be taken of the prevailingly poor level of professional knowledge and prac-
tical skills, the excessive workload of magistrates which lessens their oppor-
tunities to engage in self-education, and the incessant changes in the legis-
lation which generate many problems in the administration of justice and
often entail inconsistent case-law. In combination with other negative fac-
tors, these circumstances only make corruption thrive. To rectify that situa-
tion, major reliance is placed on the newly-established National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) with the Supreme Judicial Council which has emerged from the
non-governmental organization known as the Magistrates Training Centre.
The NIJ shall be developed based on the MTC and its attainments, curricu-
la and training materials, body of lecturers, officials and assets.
On October 1, 2003, the SJC approved the Rules of Organization and
Procedure of the National Institute of Justice. A Board of the Institute has
been elected as well. The NIJ shall provide compulsory training to:
• All newly-appointed judges and prosecutors immediately after
they take office in the judiciary (six months of initial training).
• The judges, prosecutors, and investigators when they take an
office in a body of the judiciary (10 days of initial training).
• Judges, prosecutors, investigators, bailiffs, real estate registration
judges, court staff, inspectors and other officials of the Ministry of
Justice, on a regular basis (continuous training).
Performance at the National Institute of Justice shall be relevant to
the professional evaluation of magistrates and to the promotion in
rank of court staff.
The SJC has already adopted and approved the initial training cur-
riculum for judges.
The future curricula of the NIJ should also mandatorily include training to
enforce anti-corruption legislation, to learn and comply with ethical
norms and rules, including conflict-of-interest and anti-corruption pro-
visions. In more general terms, training should contribute to instilling and
upholding in the behavior of magistrates values and principles such as
impartiality, independence, intolerance to corruption in general and to any
of its forms within the judiciary.
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B.1.4. Possible Options for Restructuring the Judiciary
The structure of the judiciary usually engenders opposing opinions and
evaluations. Some argue that the status quo should be preserved at any rate.
Others offer restructuring proposals, some of which require serious consti-
tutional amendments that could only be enacted by a Great National
Assembly (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 3 of April 10, 2003,
delivered in constitutional case No. 22 of 2002). If the Constitutional Court
changes its view and the political will is there, some of the proposed struc-
tural changes, however, may be enacted by the Ordinary National
Assembly.
Regardless of the fact that structural changes cannot in themselves resolve
all of the problems the judiciary faces, and even less so the problem of cor-
ruption, the introduction of such changes or the failure to make them would
largely predetermine the choices to be made with respect to the manage-
ment, functions and organizational principles of the judiciary.
In parallel to the proposed anti-corruption measures in the judiciary that
would be pertinent if its current structure is preserved and slightly adjusted,
two alternative options for fundamental structural modification are also on
the table. If either of those options, or some of their elements, materialize,
the basic organizational principles of the judiciary will be preserved in full
with respect to the branches that will remain in the judicial system, and
should be modified to the extent necessary to serve the branches that will
move to the executive. When the structural changes take place, the man-
aging and administrative functions of the judiciary should be clearly distin-
guished.
• Under the first option, the constitutional model of the judiciary would
comprise the authorities that administer justice, i.e., the courts, plus the
prosecution offices. While that scenario implies retaining the public
prosecution within the judiciary, it is mandatory to implement the prin-
ciple of regular and ad hoc reports by the prosecutor general to the
SJC. In addition, in the context of the proposals to decentralize the sys-
tem of public prosecution and to appoint public officials entrusted by
law with prosecutorial functions outside the system of the Supreme
Prosecution Office of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative
Prosecution Office, the appellate, district and regional prosecution
offices, it is recommended that one consider whether prosecutors from
the system of public prosecution could work in the specialized authori-
ties carrying out investigations at or outside the MoI (e.g., the National
Service for Combating Organized Crime, the Financial Intelligence
Agency, the Customs Agency, etc.).  This issue should be addressed in
more detail in relevant acts of parliament.
• Under the second option, the constitutional model of the judiciary
would only comprise those authorities that administer justice: the
courts. As far as the prosecutorial authorities are concerned, it is pro-
posed that the legislation should provide for the following organization-
al and institutional changes (after the Constitution has been amended
accordingly):
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– A National Prosecution Office should be set up within the Ministry
of Justice9. In the framework of that office, a Managing and
Administrative Board, or a High Council for Prosecutors (more or
less similar to the Supreme Judicial Council) should be created to
include the prosecutor general as the head of the Prosecution Office,
three prosecutors elected by the community of prosecutors and hav-
ing terms of office equal to the term of office of the prosecutor gen-
eral, and the minister of justice (by operation of law). To avoid the
risk that the executive might dominate the Prosecution Office and its
governing body, the prosecutor general should be nominated by the
minister of justice and elected by the National Assembly for a specif-
ic term of office (longer than four years), and the National Assembly
should again have the power to remove him or her from office under
conditions strictly listed in the Constitution.
– The prosecutor general should report to the National Assembly regu-
larly (annually) and ad hoc. That structure, where public prosecution
would be a separate institution with the executive but the prosecutor
general would be elected by and accountable to the legislature, is
expected to result in a more balanced separation of powers and a
refined mechanism of checks and balances.
– If this proposal is approved and implemented, the new office should
be an umbrella for all prosecution bodies existing at present plus the
prosecutors working at specialized authorities that conduct investiga-
tions inside or outside the Ministry of Interior for example, the
National Service for Combating Organized Crime, the Financial
Intelligence Agency, customs authorities, etc.
– The Managing and Administrative Board (High Council for
Prosecutors) should handle the staffing of, and provide methodologi-
cal guidance to, the prosecution offices and to prosecutors working
outside the prosecution system. Public prosecutors should be
autonomous, enjoy functional immunity and obey the laws when
performing their basic functions. This would be necessary to avoid
any risk of intervention by the Ministry of Justice or by any other
authority when prosecutors fulfill their duties.
To ensure adequate investigation, both options suggest that the National
Investigation Service (NIS) should be kept in place, while becoming a spe-
cialized service in the framework of Ministry of Interior deigned as follows:
– The head of the NIS should be appointed by the minister of interior
for a term of office exceeding that of the government.
– The leadership of NIS should take the form of a collective governing
body composed of the head of the NIS, a deputy minister of the MoI,
and three investigators elected by the community of investigators in the
country. All investigators should be directly subordinate to that body.
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9 Public prosecution is connected with the structure of the executive not only in established
democracies like Austria, Belgium, Denmark or Spain but also in many new democratic coun-
tries, such as Poland, and the Czech Republic.
– Investigators should exercise their functions in the structure of the NIS
directly, or at the corresponding district services of the MoI, or with-
in the specialized structures that conduct investigations outside the
system of the MoI (again, such as the National Service for Combating
Organized Crime, the Financial Intelligence Agency, customs author-
ities, etc.), under conditions laid down by the leadership of the NIS.
– In the context of the day-to-day work of investigators, their autono-
my from the structures of the MoI and from any other authorities to
which they are attached should be guaranteed, as should be their
leading role in the investigation conducted by such authorities.
The idea behind the changes proposed above is to ensure the immediate
link that is required between the police authorities that detect crime and
the investigative authorities—a link that is sadly missing in the current struc-
ture of the judiciary. Making the police and the investigative authorities part
of the same institutional mechanism would enable the formation of joint
teams and promote interaction throughout the process of investigation. The
police would thus be responsible for the final result (a successful comple-
tion of investigation), whereas the investigative authorities, as a major unit
of the MoI, would be involved more actively in the fight against and the pre-
vention of crime, and their knowledge and experience would be of imme-
diate assistance to police inspectors. This is even more important given the
essential changes that will be made following the recent closure of negotia-
tions on Chapter 24, Justice and Home Affairs. Such  reforms should include
the restructuring of the investigation system (until 2005), the development
of a strong network of police inspectors who should gradually assume
competence in investigating criminal offenses, and the imposition of limits
to the powers of investigators. Ensuring efficiency and transparency at the
pre-trial stage, eliminating the duplication of functions between police
inspectors and investigators or the duplication of investigations for
some types of offenses, and improving the deficient qualifications and
skills of most police inspectors are key requirements to judicial reform in
light of Bulgaria’s anticipated membership in the European Union.10
In the future, one may consider abolishing the investigation and entrusting
all operational activities to the police. In that scenario some police officers
could be vested with carrying out urgent investigative steps that would pro-
duce acceptable legal effects.
This being said, any change in the investigative function and in the under-
lying structure should be made in the context of thoughtful reform of crim-
inal proceedings. At the same time, it will be necessary to take due account
of the need to strictly distinguish between and regulate the powers, duties
and responsibilities of the authorities involved in that process, and to root
their relations in sound and unambiguous legislation. The resistance that
large groups of magistrates offer to any idea about changing the structure of
investigation should not be overlooked, either.
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10As of the beginning of 2003, the MoI has been working to that end. For example, new appoint-
ment requirements have been introduced, including a competition, a law degree (compulsory),
and an exam.
B.1.5. Internal Anti-Corruption Monitoring Mechanisms within
the Bodies of the Judiciary
The importance of in-house anti-corruption monitoring in the judiciary
cannot be questioned. This is also true of the entities whose operation is
linked to that of the courts, investigation services and prosecution offices,
such as the Bar and the Ministry of Interior, as corruption transactions there
could “export” corruption to the judiciary  or fuel “chain” corruption that is
hard to detect.
It is noteworthy that magis-
trates identify the lack of an
efficient internal monitor-
ing machinery and sanc-
tions as the fourth most
important factor that favors
the infusion of corruption
into the judiciary.
Most magistrates believe
that setting up specialized
units at the Supreme
Prosecution Office of
Cassation, the courts, the
investigation service, and
the Ministry of Interior that
are tasked with inquiries
into reported inside corrup-
tion, and the promotion of
such units would help limit
corruption in the judiciary.
According to the Supreme
Prosecution Office of
Cassation, its Complaints
Unit is open to any informa-
tion about corruption trans-
actions allegedly involving
magistrates or senior public
officials.
The majority of the 39
reports received until Sep-
tember 2003 were checked
by the Inspectorate Unit at
the Administrative Depart-
ment, while two of them
have been assigned to the
Investigation Department.
To resist inside corruption,
at the end of November
2003 a permanent three-
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TABLE 12 FACTORS BENEFICIAL TO THE PROLIFERATION OF 
CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Low salaries of magistrates/court staff members 55.3
Moral crisis during the period of transition 43.2
Imperfect legislation 36.1
Lack of efficient internal monitoring mechanism and sanctions 35.7
Interweaving between the official duties of magistrates and 
their private interests 31.1
Aspirations of quick wealth gain 25.1
Political connections and dependence of magistrates/court staff 16.1
Sense of untouchability/immunity 15.0
Other 2.6
Does not know/No response 4.2
TABLE 13 “WOULD THE FOLLOWING MEASURES CONTRIBUTE TO
LIMITING CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY?” (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Agree Disagree Does not know/
No response
Setting up a specialized unit within Supreme 
Prosecution Office of Cassation to inquire into 
alleged corruption 49.6 39.6 10.8
Setting up such units to inquire into alleged 
corruption in the courts 48.7 41.0 10.4
Setting up such units to inquire into alleged 
corruption in the investigation 46.0 42.7 11.2
Setting up such units to inquire into alleged 
corruption in the bodies of the MoI 48.0 40.5 11.5
member panel was set up at
the SJC. It should prevent
and combat the corruption
transactions of judges, pros-
ecutors, investigators and
the staff at all the bodies of
the judiciary. The mission of
the panel is to receive, veri-
fy, and analyze any reports
on corruption among mag-
istrates and court staff, and
to interact with other state
agencies and NGOs in
response to corruption. At
the same time, the existing
interim rules on the panel’s
procedure, structure and
organization invite mixed perceptions: the panel has no defined term of
office; it is composed of practicing magistrates who are not members of the
SJC; it is not given any powers to react to findings of corruption; and the
specific mechanisms of its interaction with other anti-corruption units in the
bodies of the judiciary remain obscure.
To curb inside corruption in the judiciary and to resist the diverse forms of
“chain” corruption, it is recommended:
• To further promote the existing specialized units and put in place new
such units within the basic structures of the judiciary. These units should
closely interact among themselves and with any other competent bod-
ies, including the relevant services of the MoI (the National Service for
Combating Organized Crime, the National Police Service Directorate,
the Operational and Technical Tracing Directorate, the Operational
Information Directorate, and the National Security Service Directorate),
the Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission with the Government,
the Anti-Corruption Standing Parliamentary Committee, the SJC, the
Court of Auditors, the Customs Agency, the General Tax Directorate, the
Financial Intelligence Agency, the Privatization Agency, the Post-
Privatization Control Agency, and the State Financial Control Agency.
• To improve the accountability of the judiciary and to report on the
number of prevented, detected or prosecuted corruption crimes involv-
ing magistrates.
• To compile on a compulsory basis statistics on the corrupt offenses
involving magistrates.
The debate on the anti-corruption dimensions of judicial reform has
revealed growing fears that some members of the Bar at times facilitate the
proliferation of corruption transactions in the judicial system and in the
public administration by acting as intermediaries or by deriving unlawful
benefits under the false pretext that bribes are solicited.
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CHART 16 INFORMATION ON CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVING 
MAGISTRATES FILED WITH THE SUPREME PROSECUTION OFFICE OF CASSATION,
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2003
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation
The actual gravity of this
problem is not confined to
the unlawful and morally
unacceptable behavior of
some attorneys but lies in its
effects as it prompts a real
growth of corruption among
magistrates and civil ser-
vants, the fundamental sym-
bols of statehood and of the
public opinion about state-
hood. To cut off those nega-
tive phenomena, decisive
legislative amendments are
required (introducing stricter
criteria for access to the legal
profession, expanding the 
scope of statutory duties of attorneys who should comply with a number of
ethical rules in order to uphold the trust and the respect needed by the pro-
fession, and refining the disciplinary proceedings for failure to fulfill statuto-
ry duties or to observe the ethics code). In addition, specific guarantees would
be necessary to secure the observance of professional ethics and discipline by
attorneys, and that obligation should be proclaimed in the Constitution.
Stricter control must be exercised by the competent internal bodies of the Bar
and responsibility should be attached to improper behavior, inter alia in the
form of disqualification of attorneys on account of clearly impertinent proce-
dural steps or abuse of procedural rights (e.g., procrastinating cases because
of pretended illnesses; this could be countered through a requirement that
the ailments of any party to the proceedings or its counsel must be confirmed
by “trusted” doctors assisting the respective court).
B.1.6. Opening the Judiciary to the Public
The general public seems to cherish an enduring perception that the vari-
ous segments of the judiciary are entrapped by sluggishness, inefficiency,
partiality and widespread corruption transactions. In turn, most magistrates
think that citizens normally have excessive expectations of the perform-
ance of the members of the judiciary, and many of them fail to know their
rights or are inclined to resort to various corruption transactions in order to
settle disputable issues “informally”.
The discrepancy between the opinion of the public and that of magistrates
on the level of corruption in the judiciary confirms the existence of a seri-
ous communication problem between the judiciary and civil society.
This is proven by the inability of magistrates or the separate branches of the
judiciary to respond adequately to critical assessments of their perform-
ance. According to the results of a survey conducted by Vitosha Research,
very few of them (25.1 %) think they should inform the public about the
shortcomings in the operation of the system they have come across.
Moreover, as public pressure grows, some branches of the judiciary per-
ceive as hostility even the well-meaning opinions and recommendations
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CHART 17 METHODS USED BY INTERESTED PARTIES TO
IMPLEMENT CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
voiced by the civil society,
by foreign governments or
international organizations.
Such reactions enhance in
turn the public suspicion
that members of the judici-
ary use their immunity as a
shield, that they are uncon-
trollable and untouchable.
An increasing number of
magistrates and experts
have become aware of the
urgent need to change the
style of communication
between the judiciary and
the public. Moreover, the
first steps have been made
to make some branches of
the system more responsive
to the problems, questions
and criticisms regarding
their operation. New prac-
tices are being developed which demonstrate the nascent aspiration of the
judiciary to open the system while relying on the media and to launch a
public dialogue to address the issues of justice in a transitional environment.
• Press offices at the bodies of the judiciary
Press offices established at some courts11 provide information to the com-
munity on cases that are of interest to the public (scheduled hearings,
progress, key points, judgments or verdicts).
The Uniform Media Strategy of the Judiciary approved by SJC on June 25, 2003
prescribes in detail the rights and the obligations of an official to be appointed
at SJC, viz. the Public Relations Officer, and of the press officers (also referred
to as “public relation officers“) to be appointed at the supreme, appellate and
district courts and prosecution offices, at the National Investigation Service
and the district investigation services and, if possible, at Sofia City Court and
some larger regional courts which are known for their vast workload. The
Strategy outlines the basic rules for communication with the media and with
other institutions. The attainment of its objectives would positively contribute
to opening the Judiciary towards society and, in the end of the day, to improv-
ing its own performance and the public perception thereof.
• Access to information about the operation of the judiciary
Increasing the judiciary’s transparency must imply the provision of access to
information about the operation of the judiciary. Such a guideline is
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11Press offices have been created and already function at the Supreme Administrative Court, the
appellate, district and regional courts in Bourgas, Varna, Veliko Turnovo and Plovdiv, and the
appellate, district, city and regional courts in Sofia. 
TABLE 14 “HOW OFTEN DO CITIZENS WITH WHOM YOU ARE IN CONTACT WHEN
FULFILLING YOUR PROFESSIONAL DUTIES— (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Nor- Some- Seldom Never Does not know/ 
mally times No response
—have excessive expectations of 
magistrates and their performance?” 56.2 28.0 8.1 2.6 5.1
—fail to know their rights?” 52.4 31.5 11.9 2.0 2.2
—show discontent with the work 
of magistrates?” 34.6 47.1 14.1 2.0 2.2
—prefer to engage in corruption acts 
rather than uphold their rights 
lawfully?” 15.4 34.6 26.9 8.8 14.3
—think they can achieve whatever 
they want by offering money or gifts?” 12.6 30.4 32.2 15.2 9.7
—behave rudely or impolitely 
towards court staff or magistrates?” 9.5 37.4 42.7 6.8 3.5
Recommendation No. R (81) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on measures facilitating access to justice. A major principle underlying
the recommendation is that member states should “take all necessary steps
to inform the public on the means open to an individual to assert his [or her]
rights before courts and to make judicial proceedings…simple, speedy and
inexpensive”.
Relevant steps to that end are the Websites developed by individual courts
and by the SJC, and a number of other initiatives designed to make the
administration of justice more transparent, for example, the project imple-
mented at Varna District Court to release court proceedings of immediate
interest to the public directly on the Internet.
As better communication between the branches of the judiciary  and the
public would require further steps, special attention should be attached to
the use and implementation of modern technology. New methods of com-
munication could include:
– launching projects to facilitate receipt from the Internet of informa-
tion about the cases and their progress, and any other useful infor-
mation, while relying on the successful practices and the experience
gained12;
– providing an implementing statutory framework on the use of elec-
tronic documents and electronic signatures in the judiciary, so as to
foster efficiency, promptness, security and transparency;
– introducing the practice of judges and prosecutors regularly answer-
ing questions addressed to them on the Internet;
– developing and using electronic information systems at the Supreme
Court of Cassation and Sofia City Court, and in as many courts across
the country as possible.
The organization and operation of the administration of judicial bodies (i.e.,
the administration of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Court of
Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general, the
Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative
Prosecution Office, the National Investigation Service, and all the courts,
prosecution offices and investigation services), briefly referred to as “court
administration”, are linked to the management of the judiciary and to the
arrangements that ensure its independence and self-governance. On the one
hand, the persisting problems in the governance of the judiciary and corrup-
tion in its branches largely precondition the shortcomings of court adminis-
tration. On the other hand, the malfunction of court administration and cor-
ruption transactions involving court staff form a straightforward obstacle to
high-quality performance of judicial bodies and adversely affect public opin-
ion about the judicial branch of power. There is a very wide discrepancy
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12For example, the websites of the Supreme Administrative Court and Varna District Court, the
possibilities for quick electronic reference to case progress information as they exist at
Blagoevgrad District Court and Blagoevgrad Regional Court, etc.
B.2. The Administration 
of Judicial Bodies
between the views of the
population and those of
magistrates when it comes
to the level of corruption
among the employees
working in the administra-
tion of judicial bodies,
whom the legislation refers
to as “court staff”.
B.2.1. Organization
and Operation
of Court
Administration:
The State of
Affairs
Although growing attention
has been given in recent
years to the need to reform
court administration, efforts
so far have mainly been
confined to drafting strate-
gic and programmatic doc-
uments. Even today, court
administration is based on
obsolete organizational
principles, staff members
work in unsuitable, fre-
quently primitive condi-
tions, no unified standards
or practices exist, and the
system is generally a far cry
from modern management
technologies. There are no
uniform and detailed rules
of secondary legislation 
regulating the operation of administrations in the courts, prosecution offices
or investigation services. All of these factors create a corruption-friendly
environment, which, in turn, could result in delaying or obstructing investi-
gation and court proceedings, including the investigation and prosecution
of corruption-related crime. 
The following specific major problems in the organization and operation of
court staff have been identified:
• Document processing in the branches of the judiciary
Case management procedures (most generally those relative to the filing
and receipt of papers with and from the court, and the prosecution office,
access to information, security of document circulation, and
inter-institutional transfer of court files) are typically opaque, awkward, and
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TABLE 15 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG COURT STAFF IN THE BRANCH
WHERE RESPONDENT MAGISTRATES WORK (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Almost all court staff members are involved in corruption 0.2
Most court staff members are involved in corruption 2.2
A few court staff members are involved in corruption 18.7
Almost no court staff members are involved in corruption 32.4
No court staff members at all are involved in corruption 30.0
Does not know/no response 16.5
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CHART 18 PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG
COURT STAFF (%, MAY 2003)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
subjective. Under those
conditions, myriad unpre-
dictable local administrative
practices emerge which
additionally frustrate the
efficient administration of
justice and sow the seeds of
distrust of the judiciary.
Such practices eat up much
of the time and efforts of
judges and of the insufficient
number of court staff mem-
bers, most of whom are not
well-trained and lack moti-
vation.
No clear rules exist regarding access to documents and records in courts,
investigation services and prosecution offices, on the issuance of documents
and the delivery of certified copies by the court, on how case files should
be accessed and used, and on who should be held liable for the disappear-
ance or destruction of individual documents or parts of files.
Automated case management system
USAID has donated to the SJC a modern document registration sys-
tem which reports on the progress of judicial proceedings and
enables many different searches and the electronic submission of
cases to higher instances. The SJC has already decided to implement
that system in all courts. Meanwhile, it operates successfully at the
District and Regional Court in Blagoevgrad, and at Smolyan Regional
Court. The document registration system of the Supreme
Administrative Court and Varna District Court is based on similar
principles. The automated document registration system also covers
the progress of enforcement proceedings. It will be accessible on the
Internet, so citizens and attorneys will be able to find information
about the cases at any time, including any scheduled hearings and
the indispensable forms to be filled out. 
• The mechanism of summoning 
The incorrect, inaccurate, or late serving of writs of summons, and the errors
possibly contained therein, as well as the absence of any remedy against inac-
curately served summonses may become major factors for delaying the cases
and manipulating the development of judicial procedures.
• The assignment of cases to individual judges and court chambers
The assignment of cases to individual judges or to different court chambers
is not always well-founded, adequate and objective. This paves the way for
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TABLE 16 CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS (E.G., OFFERING BRIBES OR TRAFFIC IN INFLUENCE)
ARE EXERTED ON COURT STAFF FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Yes (%) 
To carry out/to refrain from carrying out specific steps in processing 
court papers and documents 55.9
To knowingly violate the rules on serving summonses and 
other court papers 53.7
Other 3.1
No corruption acts take place 7.7
Does not know/No response 16.5
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corruption transactions and affects the performance of court staff. Not only
the citizens, but magistrates and staff members alike are typically convinced
that if a specific outcome is sought in a case, the file would be assigned to
specific chambers or judge-rapporteurs.
Impartial automated case-assignment system
On October 6, 2003, Division Three of the Supreme Administrative
Court launched—on an experimental basis—a new system of assign-
ing cases to judge-rapporteurs and court chambers. When adminis-
trative proceedings are instituted, the judge-rapporteur or the cham-
ber in charge are identified by an automated system which forms part
of the Court’s document registration system. After the results of that
experiment are analyzed, it will be decided on whether to apply the
same approach in the other divisions of SAC. Such measures are
needed in view of the requirement of the European Union to fully
implement an impartial automated case-assignment system by 2007.
• The imperfect mechanisms of recruiting, promoting and disciplining court staff
Beyond the lack of objective criteria or adequate procedures for recruit-
ment and career development, no efficient machinery exists in practice to
discipline court staff, even in the event of corrupt behavior or breach of the
moral rules enshrined in the Ethics Code of Court Clerks.
B.2.2. The Need to Build up a Modern Structure and
Organization of Court Administration
A set of legislative and organizational changes is indispensable in order to
efficiently modernize the operation of court administration and place it on
solid corruption-free ground.
• Improving the legislative framework
– The fundamental general principles of the operation of court
administration should be refined, as should be the status of court
staff members. This should happen by improving and elaborating on
the provisions of Chapter Fifteen of the Law on the Judiciary.
– The instruments of secondary legislation and the internal regula-
tions on the work of court administration, required under §.188 of
the Law on the Judiciary, should be drafted; these should govern in
detail and with precision the structure and the organization of court
administration, the requirements to, the recruitment criteria for, and
the specific rights and duties of staff members, as well as their con-
tinuous training and professional improvement.
– Requirements should be introduced as to the categories and num-
ber of court staff members needed in all groups of judicial bodies,
and detailed job descriptions should be prepared for them.
– The importance of ethical rules should be reiterated, and compli-
ance therewith must be ensured through appropriate controls and
sanctions.
– Thorough rules should be devised on access to information handled
by court staff (regarding employees entitled to have access, the
parameters of official secrecy, and procedures).
• Funding, logistics, and human resources for court administration
– The overall budget of the judiciary should provide for sufficient
funding, equipment and facilities for the court administration, while
rectifying the existing disparities between the judiciary and the other
branches of power, on the one hand, and among the separate
branches and bodies inside the judiciary, on the other hand. This
should be promoted by an equitable allocation of resources among
the branches of the judiciary; for example, by striking a fair balance
between the bodies in Sofia and those in the countryside.
– More funds should be earmarked in the budget of the judiciary for
the work of its administration in general, and for case management in
particular.
– The conditions of work should be improved through the rational
use and management of the Court Houses Fund which should be
relied upon to expand and improve the existing buildings of the judi-
ciary and the equipment at the work places of staff members.
– Competitions should become the standard practice of appointing
court staff, as envisaged in §. 188a of the Law on the Judiciary and in
the Rules on the Organization of Court Administration, on the Functions of
Services at Regional, District, Military and Appellate Courts, and on the
Status of Court Staff.
– A mechanism should be devised for the recruitment of new staff
members trained at specialized schools, while involving appointed
personnel in continuous training.
– New mechanisms of managing and controlling court staff should be
elaborated.
• Automating administrative work
To ensure the speedier and more transparent processing and provision of
information which would enhance the performance of court administration
and reduce to a minimum the chances for corruption transactions, the fol-
lowing measures should be implemented:
– Transfer any case-related information and operations from paper to
electronic medium and store all of the files in electronic form based
on a uniform software product implemented in all courts.
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– Introduce a new approach to the search and retrieval of case-relat-
ed information by devoting several work stations solely to this activ-
ity, which should be conducted with a software program; other staff
members would thus be able to work at ease and to concentrate on
the cases themselves and the orderly processing of court papers.
– Court services should provide any public information to outside
agencies and institutions or to private individuals (notaries, law firms,
etc.) in electronic form, in return for fees and under strict informa-
tion security arrangements embedded in the software used.
• Changing the structures and the corresponding positions
In order to modernize court administration and ensure its smooth opera-
tion, implementation of the relevant provisions of the Law on the Judiciary
and of the Rules on the Organization of Court Administration, on the Functions of
Services at Regional, District, Military and Appellate Courts, and on the Status of
Court Staff should be expedited. Similarly, a number of new positions should
be introduced (court administrators, administrative registrars, court statisti-
cians, judicial police, etc.), while the functions attached to some of the
existing positions (such as court registration clerks, and court secretaries)
should be revisited.
The above steps should considerably improve the performance of individ-
ual employees and of the court administration as a whole, and would allow
the heads of different bodies within the judiciary to rid themselves of count-
less irrelevant functions they are bound to perform now. The clear distinc-
tion between the responsibilities of different staff members would con-
tribute to a speedier, more transparent and efficient administration of jus-
tice.
• Education and training of court staff
The professional training and the integrity of court staff members are of the
essence given their responsibility in ensuring the high-quality overall opera-
tion of the judiciary. It is therefore necessary to continue to refine, within
the framework of the National Institute of Justice, the practice launched by
the Magistrates Training Centre of drafting and implementing advanced
training programs for court staff members. The programs cover, among
other things, the ethical and anti-corruption aspects of their work.
Additionally, on the basis of programs developed and agreed upon at the
national level, the training of court staff should be decentralized by court
district and the responsibility for training the staff in each district should be
entrusted to the corresponding head of the judicial body or to a magistrate
appointed there. The cooperation for training of court staff members that
has been established—including training of trainers between the National
Association of Court Clerks and the United States Agency for International
Development—provides an appropriate basis for decentralized training ini-
tiatives. Until the end of 2003, more than 700 court staff members and 40
court staff members trainers have been trained. An all-year curriculum for
training of members of court administration, including newly-appointed
court staff, has been approved to be implemented on a regional level for
2004.
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In the long run, it is pertinent to consider the introduction of compulsory
training upon any initial appointment to a given position, and this should
gradually transform into specialized training as a requirement to start
working in the court administration. Likewise, continuous training should
be offered on a standard basis to enable staff members to regularly upgrade
their skills.
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The betterment of existing legislation and the development of legal instru-
ments to combat corruption would result from improved quality, trans-
parency and accessibility of the legislative process. The National Assembly
should play a key part in countering corruption in the country by putting in
place viable feedback arrangements with all of the institutions called upon
to enforce and implement the laws passed, in particular the judiciary, and
by reducing to a minimum any chances for institutional corruption and con-
flict of interests. The Standing Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Committee set
up at the end of 2002, unfortunately, has not yet appeared to be an efficient
anti-corruption device and has not commenced any tangible measures to
eradicate corruption transactions or the conditions conducive to their
occurrence.
Quite like before, almost no steps were undertaken in 2003 to ensure a pro-
ductive fight against the major internal factors of corruption, to develop an
institutional environment apt to prevent corruption in the process of law-
making, or to compel the members of parliament to observe corruption-
barring attitudes and conduct. The Draft Law on the Ethical Norms Applicable
to the Work of the Members of Parliament, presented in 2002, never saw the
light of day, nor was a standing parliamentary ethics committee set up. The
required degree of transparency of the income and property of members of
parliament, including the funding of their election campaigns, has remained
equally remote.
When legislative instruments used by the judiciary to combat corruption are
reviewed, serious deficiencies are revealed. Magistrates share this view as
they regard imperfect legislation as the third most important factor con-
tributing to corruption within the judiciary. The formulation of a legal
framework and the day-to-day practice of law-making have suffered a num-
ber of setbacks. The frequent passage of new laws is not preceded by seri-
ous analysis, wide public hearings or the elaboration of an overall philoso-
phy for the legislation in question in line with the priorities of society and
the acts already in place. Legal instruments are adopted or merged in a
somewhat automated fashion, without a consistent conceptual basis and,
more often than not, draft laws are approved as a result of external pressure
or for the purpose of protecting specific private interests.
While amendments to Bulgarian legislation in recent years have introduced
internationally recognized anti-corruption instruments and standards, no
sufficient measures have been adopted to ensure their efficient implemen-
tation. In December 2003, Bulgaria signed the UN Convention against
Corruption, the first ever universal legal treaty in this area. The convention
focuses on the prevention of corruption and the repatriation of illegally-
55
C. LEGISLATIVE REFORM: THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AND
CHANGES REQUIRED TO COMBAT CORRUPTION
acquired and -exported capital. Many of the standards of the convention
have already been embedded in Bulgarian law in the process of harmoniz-
ing domestic legislation with Council of Europe and OECD anti-corruption
conventions. Nonetheless, the timely ratification of that convention would
enable the country to partake in the technical assistance mechanism pro-
vided therein. The convention currently leaves open the issue of compli-
ance monitoring. Bulgaria should therefore become actively involved in the
development of such machinery under the Convention, especially in light
of the relevant experience gained so far.
The question about the quality of, and the need for, serious changes to
improve the process of justice is still on the agenda. It touches upon the
organic rules of the judiciary, as well as on the major legal instruments that
the bodies of the judiciary must use. These are in particular substantive
criminal law and criminal procedure which bear directly on the criminal-
ization, detection and prosecution of corruption-related offenses, and civil
and administrative law and procedure which should, directly or indirectly,
create conditions unfavorable for corruption in the judiciary and in society.
Criminal repression is among the most powerful tools a state has at its dis-
posal to suppress corruption. The major role attributed to criminal law
instruments in combating corruption derives from the fact that, when
implementing its criminal justice policy, any state pursues at least two
objectives: to punish the perpetrators of criminal acts, including corruption
acts; and to deter and discipline not only the perpetrators but all other
members of society.
The current system of criminal prosecution is, for the most part, slow,
unwieldy and inefficient. On the one hand, the crimes and the penalties
specified in the Criminal Code fail to adequately mirror what is a growing
criminality in the modern setting of a market economy. On the other hand,
the framework of criminal procedure, as embedded in the existing Code of
Criminal Procedure, fails to provide sufficient mechanisms and guarantees for
the swift and efficient closure of criminal proceedings with effective crimi-
nal judgments which, in turn, opens the door to corruption influences.
According to information provided by the Ministry of Interior, the difficulty
in implementing criminal repression as provided for in the Criminal Code,
especially in cases not directly linked to bribery (the most typical corruption
crime) is among the key criminogenic factors that exacerbate the spread of
corruption.
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C.1. Criminal Law 
Instruments Used 
to Combat Corruption
Over the past years, numerous legislative amendments have been made in
an effort to modernize criminal law and procedure. Some of those enact-
ments, however, were piecemeal and were often detached from any clear
and consistent philosophy underlying criminal justice reforms. The major
concern behind those amendments was to modernize domestic legislation
and to bring it in line with the European requirements to respect human
rights, while offering a swift and efficient administration of justice.
Those objectives, though, have mostly remained unattained. This fuels the
need to go on with reforms so as to build up a modern and efficient sys-
tem for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, including
corruption, and to introduce efficient legislative mechanisms that
enable the prevention of corruption in the context of criminal prosecu-
tion itself.
A prerequisite for the successful attainment of those objectives is to root the
reform of criminal law and procedure in a conceptually sound philosophy
underlying a new criminal justice policy, and in modern crime-
determent strategies. That new philosophy should form the basis to adopt
new Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Law on the Execution
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13 Before the last amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure made in 2003 (in effect as of June
3, 2003), proceedings for office-related offenses under § 282-283 of the Criminal Code, and for
bribery under § 304-307 of the Criminal Code, were within the competence of regional (first-tier)
courts at first instance. After the amendments, the proceedings for those crimes have come
under the jurisdiction of district (second-tier) courts at first instance.
TABLE 17 NUMBER OF CASES OF BRIBERY AND OFFICE-RELATED
CRIME, FIRST HALF OF 200313
Source: Ministry of Justice
Offenses Cases to be tried Closed cases Duration Appeals Pending at 
(section of of proceedings end of 
the Criminal Code) period
Pending at Newly Closed Disconti- Up to 3 Over 3 
beginning instituted with nued mounths mounths
of sentence
period
Regional courts
§. 255c - 2 2 2 - 2 - -
§ 282 & 283 90 77 33 53 32 54 32 81
§ 304-307 12 6 7 2 5 4 2 9
District (city) courts
§ 301-303 18 10 7 2 2 7 3 19
Military courts
§ 301-303 7 6 4 3 4 3 1 6
of Penalties, which should provide for new legal structures, use uniform ter-
minology, and have coherent systems. Meanwhile, given the complexity of
that process and the lengthy period of time it needs, reforms could continue
successfully even within the existing pieces of legislation, thus allowing the
reform of the legislative framework to gradually take place while the new
legal instruments are in the making.
C.1.1. Criminal Law
• The state of affairs: Measures undertaken to date
Corruption is a phenomenon that goes beyond the narrow confines of
bribery. It is also connected with many other types of criminal activity
occurring in virtually all segments of the economy and government. For
example, the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation has a system of
monitoring corruption-related offenses where it employs a working defini-
tion of corruption embracing all forms of abuse of power that have as their
purpose or effect the attainment of benefits for an individual or a group.
That broad definition covers the different forms of embezzlement by pub-
lic officials (§ 201-205 of the Criminal Code), general economic crime (§ 219,
220 and 224 of the Criminal Code), the offenses in different economic sec-
tors (§ 228 of the Criminal Code), smuggling (§ 242(3) of the Criminal Code),
tax offenses (§ 257 of the Criminal Code), office-related crime (§ 282, 283
and 283a of the Criminal Code), the enticement of public officials working at
a pre-trial body or at the prosecution or the court into encroaching upon
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TABLE 18 NUMBER OF PERSONS SENTENCED FOR BRIBERY OR
OFFICE-RELATED CRIME, FIRST HALF OF 2003
Source: Ministry of Justice
Offenses Total Acquittals Sentenced persons Persons 
(section of number Total Imprisonment Fine Correc- Other with 
the Criminal Code) of Less than 3-15 Over 15 tional penalties penalty
persons 3 years years years, life labor under 
tried imprisonment § 414g of 
or life the Code 
imprisonment of
Gene- Suspen- without Criminal
ral ded parole Procedure
Regional courts
§ 225c - 2 - - 2 2 - - - - -
§ 282 & 283 89 33 33 14 13 2 - 16 1 - 11
§ 304-307 10 - 8 1 1 - - 7 - - -
District courts
§ 301-303 16 8 8 4 2 1 - - - 1 -
Military courts
§ 301-303 6 2 2 1 1 1 - - - - -
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their duties in the administration of justice (§ 289 of the Criminal Code), all
forms of bribery and trade in influence (§301-307a of the Criminal Code),
and offenses by public officials (§ 387 of the Criminal Code).
During the last few years, substantive criminal law has seen fundamental
changes aimed at improving the prevention and prosecution of corruption-
related crimes. Given the series of amendments to the Criminal Code, the
substantive criminal rules on corruption offenses now seem to be very close
to the relevant European standards. Along with the improvement of the
legal framework of bribery, which is the most typical corruption crime, a
number of other major corruption transactions, such as trade in influence
or bribes in the private sector, have been incriminated. The rules on some
offenses that are often found to be directly linked to genuine corruption
crimes have been improved as well, for instance office-related offenses
and tax-related offenses.
From January to the end of September of 2003, the Supreme
Prosecution Office of Cassation obtained from over half of the district
prosecution offices and from five military prosecution offices in the
country information about a total of 51 preliminary proceedings insti-
tuted under § 310-307a of the Criminal Code; over the same period,
the investigation of 32 cases had been finished, and 21 of those had
been brought to court with bills of indictment.
Between January and September 2003, the prosecution offices across
the country instituted a total of 1526 preliminary proceedings based
on the rules of the Criminal Code that come under the working defi-
nition of corruption. During the same period, a total of 226 cases
were finalized by the prosecutors and brought to court with bills of
indictment.
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation
In September 2003, the Council of Ministers presented the National
Assembly with latest Draft Amendments to the Criminal Code, which were
voted on by the parliament at the first reading on September 25, 2003.
Some of the changes considered are directly or indirectly linked with the
fight against corruption, the most essential of them being:
– The introduction of texts to cover unauthorized access to classified
information and to modernize the provisions relative to the protec-
tion of state secrecy, in line with the Law on the Protection of Classified
Information enacted in April 2002. Access to classified information is a
sphere where offenses are often immediately linked to the existence
of corruption transactions.
– The streamlining of criminal rules on illicit foreign trade in arms or
in dual-use articles and technologies. The legislation currently cov-
ers only situations where such foreign trade occurs without due
authorization. The changes will extend the scope of the rules to any
illicit trade that occurs contrary to prohibitions, restrictions or sanc-
tions imposed by the UN Security Council, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe or the European Union, or by
virtue of bilateral or multilateral international treaties to which
Bulgaria is a party, or further to secondary legislation passed by the
Council of Ministers. In addition, the draft proposes to incriminate
the intervention as an intermediary in foreign trade transactions in
arms or dual-use articles or technologies, even where the transaction
itself has taken place outside Bulgaria.
The bulk of the proposals are in fact designed to refine the criminal provi-
sions on money laundering. Changes are indeed necessary, as those
offenses pose a heightened threat to society. In particular, it is crucial to
effectively prevent the placement of funds derived directly or indirectly
from criminal activities into commercial turnover. It is also necessary to
bring Bulgarian law in harmony with the Council of Europe’s Convention on
the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (in
effect for Bulgaria as of 1993), the special recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force, and with a number of directives in this area adopted by
the Council of the European Union. Money laundering-related crime is a
frequent corollary of corruption transactions, so the successful enforcement
of the new rules would materially contribute to cracking down on corrup-
tion. The draft amendments relate to several main aspects:
– Introducing new forms of actus reus (criminal acts or omissions) for
the offense of money-laundering, such as: concealing the origin,
location, movement or actual rights in property which the perpetra-
tors know or assume to have been acquired through or in relation to
a crime; and the acquisition, receipt, possession, use, transformation
or assistance in any manner with the transformation of such proper-
ty. 
– Extending the scope of application of anti-money laundering crim-
inal provisions to cases where the crime through or in relation to
which the property was acquired falls outside the criminal jurisdiction
of Bulgaria.
– Expressly conferring on the state the power to confiscate not only
the immediate object of a crime but also any property into which
that object has been transformed.
In December 2003 the National Assembly adopted two ratification laws in
relation to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption:
one for ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Convention signed by the coun-
try on May 15, 2003, and the other for withdrawing the reservations, made
by Bulgaria in accordance with Article 37, paragraph 1 of the convention.
The Additional Protocol envisages that each party shall adopt such legislative
and other measures to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law
the active and passive bribery of arbitrators and jurors. In fact, such meas-
ures have already been undertaken in Bulgarian criminal law even before
the signing of the Additional Protocol and the offenses in question have been
incriminated by the amendments to the Criminal Code of September 2002.
The same amendments made possible the withdrawal of the reservations as
well.
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• Required legislative amendments
In spite of the essential leg-
islative amendments to sub-
stantive criminal law intend-
ed to penalize corruption
crimes, a significant number
of magistrates still believe
that the Criminal Code
reveals serious gaps and
drawbacks in that respect.
According to 61% of the
magistrates interviewed, the
latest amendments, passed
on September 13, 2002 
(in force as of October 1,
2002), have failed to provide
full coverage of all social 
relations where corruption might occur, whereas 76.4% are of the view that
legislation in this area needs further improvement.
To uproot the existing problems in the field of substantive criminal law, the
following measures should be undertaken:
– Refining the definition of “public official” in order to adjust the
inconsistencies in its content. While the latest amendments to the
Criminal Code have extended the concept of “public official” in
response to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, some groups of individuals from the private sector still
come within the ambit of the definition.
– Extending the scope of the penalty of fine so as to cover a number
of office-related offenses driven by self-interest which could, in
essence, represent acts of corruption. With the latest amendments to
the Criminal Code of 2002 partial efforts were made to that effect since
the penalty of fine was introduced as an alternative or a complement
to imprisonment imposable for different forms of bribery and for the
newly-criminalized trade in influence. This approach should also be
applied extensively to many other corruption-related offenses for
which imprisonment remains the only possible sanction.
– Reconsidering whether or not the penalty of correctional labor
should remain in the system of sanctions, and devising new content
for the penalty of public reprimand. These penalties were coined in
a completely different social environment and can hardly be
enforced now, hence the need for their modernization or abolition.
– Improving the legal framework of probation, given its deplorable
wording and its doubtful conformity with the Constitution. This makes
it possible to treat defendants unequally and unfairly when that
penalty is imposed with the sentence and when the specific proba-
tion measures are individualized.
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TABLE 19 ASSESSMENT OF THE AMENDMENTS OF SEPTEMBER 13, 2002, TO THE CRIMINAL 
PROVISIONS IMMEDIATELY INCRIMINATING VARIOUS TYPES OF CORRUPTION
TRANSACTIONS (CRIMINAL CODE, SPECIAL PART):
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Yes No Does not know/
No response
The rules cover in full all social relations where 
corruption might occur 20.9% 61.0% 18.1%
The penalties envisaged are proportionate to the 
incriminated offenses 39.2% 39.6% 21.1%
The legislation needs improvement in 
that respect 76.4% 11.7% 11.9%
– The offense of bribery should be given a better systematic location
by its inclusion in a separate chapter of the Criminal Code. The title of
that specific division (or chapter) should be revised as well in light of
the fact that it will cover both bribery and trade in influence.
– Introducing a clear and accurate definition of the concept of “bene-
fit” and re-wording § 307a of the Criminal Code to specify that any object
of bribery shall be forfeited where it constitutes a tangible benefit.
– Adding police inspectors to the group of officials who are deemed
to occupy responsible positions, so as to regulate their criminal lia-
bility accordingly.
– Updating the rules on some other offenses (e.g., document-relat-
ed crimes) which are often connected with or conceal the commis-
sion of genuine corruption offenses.
– Providing statutory rules on corporate “criminal” liability. Many cor-
ruption offenses are committed to the benefit of legal entities which,
nonetheless, cannot be efficiently sanctioned under any piece of
existing legislation in Bulgaria. To resolve that matter, one of two
paths might be followed: one is drafting a separate law on corporate
liability that would enable the easy forfeiture of benefits derived from
or received through criminal activity; and the other is envisaging,
within the Criminal Code itself or within the future Code of
Administrative Procedure, specific administrative liability for legal enti-
ties, while defining in parallel those individuals who would incur
criminal liability for the unlawful activities in which a legal entity was
involved.
While the existing legal rules on corruption crimes in the Criminal Code
largely match modern standards, there is no decisive will yet to apply the
new criminal legislation and to improve the capacity of courts and law
enforcement to suppress corruption. In this respect, it is of utmost impor-
tance that an adequate case law on the implementation of the new provi-
sions on bribery and other corruption-related crimes, adopted in 2002, be
established that is in compliance with the Explanatory Report on the Council
of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
C.1.2. Criminal Procedure
• The state of affairs: Measures undertaken to date
In the last years, a series of legislative amendments have been undertaken
in criminal procedure and many of them have divided the legal communi-
ty in their opinions. Although some of the amendments to criminal proce-
dure have been incoherent, the red threads of reform are visible and can be
said to mirror the established international standards, the progress made in
different legal systems, and the experience of practitioners involved with
criminal procedure. The major goal of the amendments to the Code of
Criminal Procedure was to strike the right balance between reliable guaran-
tees for human rights and the efficient administration of justice.
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In May 2003, the National
Assembly passed yet anoth-
er Law on Amending and
Supplementing the Code of
Criminal Procedure (in effect
as of June 3, 2003) with a
number of provisions
intended to speed up the
development and comple-
tion of criminal cases. The
most important of those
amendments could be sum-
marized as follows:
– Further to earlier 2002
amendments to the
Criminal Code, the so-
called mixed pro-
ceedings (public-pri-
vate proceedings) were
introduced. In those
cases for some offens-
es under the Criminal
Code the criminal pro-
cedure is initiated by
the victim’s lodging a
complaint with the
public prosecution but,
once the prosecutor
decides to prosecute,
the proceedings can
no longer be discon-
tinued at the request
of the victim. For 
other offenses, the proceedings are discontinued if the victim
requests so prior to the start of inquiry by the court of first instance.
– The possibility to bring civil claims at the pre-trial stage of criminal
proceedings was abolished.
– The preliminary police inquiry was abolished, so it is no longer a
prerequisite for instituting preliminary criminal proceedings where no
sufficient data exist that an offense was committed. Under the
amendments, when urgent investigation steps have to be made, the
preliminary proceedings shall be deemed instituted as from the date
of the official warrant stating that the respective investigative step has
been undertaken.
– The original rules on plea bargaining were restored by repealing the
improvident earlier amendments made in 2001.
– The right of the accused to request that the court, after the expiration
of a certain statutory time limit from the submission of the indictment 
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TABLE 20 MAJOR INVESTIGATION INDICATORS,
FIRST HALF OF 2003
Source: National Investigation Service
Indicator Office-related Bribery General economic 
crimes (§ 282-283 (§ 301-307 crime (§ 219-227 
of the Criminal of the Criminal of the Criminal 
Code) Code) Code)
Unclosed from earlier 
periods 2250 96 826
Newly instituted 364 28 141
Total cases in proceedings 2667 126 1000
Closed with 
a recommendation— 519 29 213
—to bring to court 122 16 53
—to discontinue proceedings 325 8 140
—to suspend proceedings 72 5 20
Remaining open at 
period end 2125 96 771
Accused persons— 166 16 71
—arrested 4 2
—foreign nationals 1
Damages inflicted BGN 11 514 234 BGN 19 681 BGN 4 858 833
Additional damages found
Damages redressed BGN 112 137 BGN 1000 BGN 13 570
Collateral provided BGN 393 000
Cases assigned by Prosecutor General to National Investigation Service (first half of 2003): 16
(two years in the case
of indictment for seri-
ous offenses, and one
year in any other
case), hear his or her
case on its merits, was
introduced.
– The original rules on
police investigation
were restored by re-
pealing the pointless
amendments made in
2001.
– The possibility of the
judge-rapporteur and
of the court of first
instance to discon-
tinue the trial and to
remit the case to the public prosecutor for further investigation on
grounds of serious procedural violations is now solely confined to
those cases where the violation in question has resulted in limiting
the procedural rights of the accused or of the counsel for the defense.
– The court has been enabled to impose a fine of up to BGN 500 on
any party, witness or expert whose failure to appear without good
reason has resulted in adjourning a hearing.
– The possibility for public prosecutors to bring a new indictment for
the first time before the court of appeal was abolished.
– The possibility of public prosecutors to appeal at three instances,
against the order of the court, to remit a case to the pre-trial stage,
together with the possibility to appeal at three instances, against the
warrants of the public prosecutor, to discontinue the criminal pro-
ceedings, was abolished.
The imperfect wording of the new texts of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which changed the jurisdiction over customs-related offenses, necessitated
the urgent passage of a new Law on Amending and Supplementing the Code of
Criminal Procedure (in force as of June 24, 2003) to rectify the inconsisten-
cies. The amendments brought that category of cases within the jurisdiction
of regional (first-tier) courts again. Under the previous regime, those offens-
es were subject to the jurisdiction of district (second-tier) courts, but cus-
toms inspectors had the power to investigate them, contrary to the explicit
provison of the Code of Criminal Procedure that cases heard by district courts
at first instance must be investigated by investigators through the machinery
of preliminary proceedings. The amendments also empowered the
National Investigation Service to investigate offenses committed by officials
enjoying immunity or by members of the Council of Ministers. Also refined
were the rules on the employment in criminal proceedings of evidence col-
lected subject to the Law on Special Intelligence Means.
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èË ÔÂ‰‚‡ËÚÂÎÌ‡Ú‡ ÔÓ‚ÂÍ‡ (ËÁ‚˙ÌÔÓˆÂÒÛ‡ÎÌ‡ ‰ÂÈÌÓÒÚ) 15.9
èË ÔÓÎËˆÂÈÒÍÓÚÓ ‡ÁÒÎÂ‰‚‡ÌÂ 19.6
èË ÔÂ‰‚‡ËÚÂÎÌÓÚÓ ÔÓËÁ‚Ó‰ÒÚ‚Ó 15.6
Ç Ò˙‰Â·Ì‡Ú‡ Ù‡Á‡ 19.4
ÑÛ„‡ 1.1
Ç˙‚ ‚ÒË˜ÍË ˜‡ÒÚË Â Â‰Ì‡Í‚Ó ‡ÁÔÓÒÚ‡ÌÂÌ‡ 10.6
Ç Ì‡Í‡Á‡ÚÂÎÌÓÚÓ ÔÓËÁ‚Ó‰ÒÚ‚Ó ÌﬂÏ‡ ÍÓÛÔˆËﬂ 4.4
çÂ ÁÌ‡Â/ÌÂ ÓÚ„Ó‚ÓËÎ 13.4
TABLE 21 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AT VARIOUS STAGES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Preliminary police inquiry (steps undertaken outside the context of formal 
criminal proceedings) 15.9%
Police investigation 19.6%
Preliminary proceedings 15.6%
Trial 19.4%
Other 1.1%
Equally spread at all stages 10.6%
No corruption exists in criminal proceedings 4.4%
Does not know/No response 13.4%
A detailed analysis of the major advantages and drawbacks of the amend-
ments to the Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 2003, and of their anti-
corruption potential, is offered in the Corruption Assessment Report of 2002,
and the Judicial Anti-Corruption Program of 2003.
• Required legislative amendments
The latest changes in the Code of Criminal Procedure fail to comprehensively
resolve existing problems with the investigation and prosecution of corrup-
tion-related crime. The poor efficiency of criminal procedure prevents the
state from pursuing its criminal-law claims on time, and, therefore, compels
further reforms along the following lines:
– Accelerating criminal proceedings by extending the number of
cases where no pre-trial proceedings take place, but the procedure
is initiated and develops under the rules on criminal cases prosecut-
ed on complaint by the victim.
– Regulating preliminary proceedings on the model of police investi-
gation, while keeping the procedural formalities only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the rights of the individuals concerned and
the reliability of evidence. The higher degree of procedural formalism
is a key factor conducive to the spread of corruption, so doing away
with at least some of that formalism would restrain the chances of
exerting corruption pressure.
– Introducing additional measures to ensure the quick development
of investigation; for example, by introducing deadlines, the expiry of
which would bar the submission of the case to court, or by shorten-
ing the duration of coercive measures. The timely closure of investi-
gation would thus be encouraged and the possibilities to apply cor-
ruption pressure will diminish materially.
– Improving the rules on police investigations by limiting the opportu-
nities of public prosecutors to transform police investigations into
preliminary proceedings. As a matter of practice, that prosecutorial
power is a means to procrastinate the pre-trial procedure beyond any
reasonable limit, thus inviting attempts to exert corruption influence.
– Keeping at a minimum the instances where the court remits the
case to the prosecutor. This should help speed up the proceedings
and their completion, and reign in corruption.
– Changing the rules on summoning so as to relieve the court from
the duty to summon and provide for an obligation on each party to
ensure the appearance of its own witnesses, as well as introducing
stricter requirements to parties to present their evidence on time
provided that after a certain statutory deadline each party should
have to submit good reason for any request to present new evidence.
– Restricting the current possibility of prosecutors to modify 
the charges at trial in order to improve the quality of preliminary
proceedings and facilitate the hearing of cases by the court. The 
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possibility for prosecu-
tors to modify at trial
the indictment they
have brought them-
selves places them un-
deservedly in a privile-
ged position, thus so-
metimes inviting cor-
ruption pressure.
– Improving the legal
rules on appeals so
as to accelerate crimi-
nal proceedings. The
existence of three re-
gular court instances
prevents the timely
entry into force of
criminal judgments,
unduly inhibits the
progress of cases, and
encourages parties to
resort to corruption
pressure. Several pos-
sibilities exist to
amend the rules on
appeals. For instance,
providing the parties
with an option to
“skip” some appeal
instances and directly
lodge a cassation
appeal after the time
limit to refer the mat-
ter to the court of
appeal has lapsed; or 
excluding the opportunity for criminal judgments delivered by a
court with jurors to be subject to appeal before any lower instance;
or providing that cassation appeals shall constitute an exceptional
remedy, i.e., after the expiration of the time limit to lodge appeals with
the competent higher court, or after that court delivers judgment, the
act of the first instance would still be subject to cassation appeal but
shall meanwhile enter into force and be executed, unless the court
orders otherwise.
– Introducing various types of differentiated procedures such as trans-
action, criminal warrant, victim-offender mediation organized by the
prosecutor, and numerous other schemes known to be efficient and
useful tools in most modern legal systems.
– Rethinking the principle of legality at the point of bringing the indict-
ment to court. A possibility here is to provide for discretionary pow-
ers of prosecutors to make a case-by-case evaluation of whether
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èÓÍÛÓË
á‡ ‰‡ ÔÂÍ‡ÚË Ì‡Í‡Á‡ÚÂÎÌÓ ÔÓËÁ‚Ó‰ÒÚ‚Ó 63.4
á‡ ‰‡ Ó·‡ÁÛ‚‡/‰‡ ÌÂ Ó·‡ÁÛ‚‡ ‰ÓÒ˙‰Â·ÌÓ ÔÓËÁ‚Ó‰ÒÚ‚Ó 
ËÎË ÔÂ‰‚‡ËÚÂÎÌ‡ ÔÓ‚ÂÍ‡ 49.3
á‡ ‰‡ ‚ÌÂÒÂ/‰‡ ÌÂ ‚ÌÂÒÂ Ó·‚ËÌËÚÂÎÂÌ ‡ÍÚ 27.8
á‡ ‰‡ ‚˙ÌÂ ÌÂÓÒÌÓ‚‡ÚÂÎÌÓ ‰ÂÎÓÚÓ Á‡ ‰ÓÔ˙ÎÌËÚÂÎÌÓ ‡ÁÒÎÂ‰‚‡ÌÂ 23.3
á‡ ‰‡ ÌÂ ËÁ‚˙¯Ë ÔÓˆÂÒÛ‡ÎÌË ‰ÂÈÒÚ‚Ëﬂ ‚ ÒÎÛ˜‡ËÚÂ, 
ÍÓ„‡ÚÓ Â Á‡‰˙ÎÊÂÌ ‰‡ „Ë ËÁ‚˙¯Ë 19.8
á‡ ‰‡ ÛÔ‡ÊÌË ÌÂÂ„Î‡ÏÂÌÚË‡ÌÓ ‚ÎËﬂÌËÂ 17.0
ÑÛ„Ë 1.5
çÂ ÒÂ ËÁ‚˙¯‚‡Ú ÍÓÛÔˆËÓÌÌË ‰ÂÈÒÚ‚Ëﬂ 4.6
çÂ ÁÌ‡Â/ÌÂ ÓÚ„Ó‚ÓËÎ 12.3
ëÎÂ‰Ó‚‡ÚÂÎË
á‡ ‰‡ ËÁ‚˙¯Ë/‰‡ ÌÂ ËÁ‚˙¯Ë ÓÔÂ‰ÂÎÂÌË ÔÓˆÂÒÛ‡ÎÌÓ-ÒÎÂ‰ÒÚ‚ÂÌË ‰ÂÈÒÚ‚Ëﬂ 59.5
á‡ ‰‡ ÒÔÂ ‡ÁÒÎÂ‰‚‡ÌÂÚÓ ËÎË ‰‡ Ì‡Ô‡‚Ë ÔÂ‰ÎÓÊÂÌËÂ Á‡ ÔÂÍ‡Úﬂ‚‡ÌÂÚÓ ÏÛ 56.2
á‡ ‰‡ ÛÔ‡ÊÌË ÌÂÂ„Î‡ÏÂÌÚË‡ÌÓ ‚ÎËﬂÌËÂ 28.0
ÑÛ„Ë 2.2
çÂ ÒÂ ËÁ‚˙¯‚‡Ú ÍÓÛÔˆËÓÌÌË ‰ÂÈÒÚ‚Ëﬂ 6.2
çÂ ÁÌ‡Â/ÌÂ ÓÚ„Ó‚ÓËÎ 13.2
TABLE 22 “WHY ARE CORRUPTION ACTS (OFFERING BRIBES, TRADE IN INFLUENCE, ETC.)
UNDERTAKEN VIS-A`-VIS THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS?”
àÁÚÓ˜ÌËÍ: ëåä Ì‡ äÓ‡ÎËˆËﬂ 2000
Public prosecutors
To discontinue the criminal proceedings 63.4%
To institute/to fail to institute pre-trial proceedings or preliminary 
police inquiry 49.3%
To bring/to fail to bring an indictment before the court 27.8%
To remit the case for further investigation without good reason 2 .3%
To fail to carry out certain procedural steps where under an obligation 
to undertake them 19.8%
To exert improper influence 17.0%
Other 1.5%
No corruption acts are carried out 4.6%
Does not know/No response 12.3%
Investigators
To carry out or to fail to carry out certain procedural steps relative to investigation 59.5%
To suspend the investigation or to propose its discontinuance 56.2%
To exert improper influence 28.0%
Other .2%
No corruption acts are carried out 6.2%
Does not know/No response 13.2%
bringing the indictment to court would serve the state or the public
interest.
– Introducing so-called pre-trial hearings which enable the accused to
request that the court assess how well-founded the charges are and,
hence, spare the trial when the indictment is not really supported by
the evidence in the file.
– Improving the rules on witness protection by putting in place effi-
cient mechanisms to guarantee the personal safety of witnesses, so as
to motivate the active involvement of citizens in the fight against cor-
ruption.
C.1.3. The Role of the Ministry of Interior in Detecting and
Preventing Corruption
The successful fight against and prosecution of corruption offenses largely
depends on how efficient the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is in detecting the
offenses committed, and on the degree of cooperation between the MoI
and the bodies of the judiciary.
Preliminary information provided by the MoI shows that 1348 cases of
office-related crime and 67 cases of bribery were detected during the peri-
od January - November 2003.
Compared to the same period of the year before, office-related crime clearly
saw a substantial reduction,
while bribery increased,
although slightly. Office-
related crime, however,
which often goes hand in
hand with corruption, is the
fourth-most wide-spread
economic offense (10.3%),
while the relative share of
bribery is virtually insignifi-
cant (just 0.5%).
The key prerequisite to promoting the effectiveness of the MoI in the fight
against corruption is to implement adequate ways and means to resist cor-
ruption within the Ministry itself. The MoI has made important steps in that
respect in recent years by, among other things, improving the overall organ-
ization of corruption-preventive and detection efforts, updating its internal
anti-corruption regulations, ensuring the structural independence of the
specialized units in charge of combating corruption, improving its in-house
supervision and control, and improving its work with the media in provid-
ing information on established instances of corruption.
During the year 2003, inquiries into corruption-related offenses were carried
out and closed on 307 MoI officers identified in information received by the
Ministry. The initial information was confirmed in relation to 171 officers. As
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TABLE 23 STATISTICS ON DETECTED CORRUPTION-RELATED
CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Source: Ministry of Interior
January - November Office-related crime Bribery
(§ 282-285 of the Criminal Code) (§ 301-307a of the Criminal Code)
2002 1808 58
2003 1348 67
a result, disciplinary proceedings were launched against 73 officers, adminis-
trative proceedings were opened against 99 officers, and the files of 49 offi-
cers were submitted to the public prosecution. The analysis of the existing
data on corruption inside the MoI has shown that the key factor that influ-
ences the occurrence of corruption is the sheer amount of classified informa-
tion, which is often disclosed or exchanged because of corruption considera-
tions, and the desire for subsequent benefits in different forms. To eliminate
the prerequisites and conditions causing the phenomenon of corruption,
measures are being implemented to increase inter-agency control and to 
create preconditions for intolerance to corruption actions among MoI staff.
In the long run, the anti-corruption efforts of the MoI will depend on the
objectives and the tasks identified in the Draft Program for the Implementation
of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2004-2005. The main aspects of those
efforts will be: the efficient implementation within the MoI of best practices
and European standards in preventing and combating corruption; the con-
tinued development of a comprehensive MoI system of structural units in
charge of fighting in-house corruption and corruption in the central or local
administration; the enhanced capacity to detect, investigate and combat
corruption;  reinforced professional integrity and better career opportuni-
ties for MoI officers; and updating the anti-corruption training programs
offered to the staff.
C.1.4. Execution of Penalties
• The state of affairs: Measures undertaken to date
The execution of penalties is of the essence for the success of any country’s
criminal policy. It is through the execution of criminal penalties that the per-
petrators of crimes, including corruption-related ones, are effectively pun-
ished. On the other hand, the preventative effect sought by criminal repres-
sion can only be attained through the efficient execution of criminal sanc-
tions. Finally, the execution of penalties is still an area where various cor-
ruption transactions seem to thrive.
The latest amendments to the Law on the Execution of Penalties enacted in
2002 introduced numerous changes intended to improve the legal frame-
work of the execution of penalties and curb the possibilities for corruption.
The law now covers a number of instruments and methods previously gov-
erned by secondary legislation. Substantial portions of the law were brought
into line with the requirements of European and international law.
• Required legislative amendments
In spite of the recent amendments, the current legal provisions suffer a
number of weaknesses which prevent the efficient execution of sentences
and are often conducive to corruption. The following amendments should
be considered absolute necessities in overcoming those weaknesses:
– Refining the rules that lay down the procedure and the conditions
for relocating accused individuals detained on remand from
investigation arrest locations to prison facilities.
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– Putting in place detailed legal rules on the rights and obligations of
convicts, of individuals detained on remand, and of supervising
and security officers at the penitentiary facilities so as to restrict the
attempts to corrupt prison staff at lower levels.
– Improving the system of control over those steps of the adminis-
tration that might affect the rights of sentenced persons, and enhanc-
ing public control of the operation of penitentiaries.
– Urgently adopting rules on the execution of the penalty of proba-
tion which was introduced by the amendments to the Criminal Code
of 2002. The provisions of the Criminal Code on probation entered
into force on January 1, 2004, but the non-existing framework for the
execution of that penalty may block its efficient use.
The numerous legislative amendments in recent years have not always been
judicious and consistent, and have translated into contradictory case-law—
a trend that persisted in 2003. This situation fails to foster the prevention of
corruption in civil justice, while the application of the laws in force is
deprived of the required anti-corruption strength.
The disturbing findings about the situation with civil law and procedure
(including the enforcement of judgments and the provision of collateral) ge-
nerate the need for a swift and radical anti-corruption reform with respect
to civil procedure, and for a further systematic, coherent and consistent
development of substantive civil law. To outline the parameters of that deve-
lopment and the specific reforms to be proposed, it is necessary to identify
the existing problems and to carry out a serious and in-depth analysis of all
the factors that impede the problem-free development of a modern civil
turnover in the establishment of a free market economy and under the rule
of law.
C.2.1. Civil Law: The State of Affairs
• Property law 
In the field of property law, the main areas of corruption pressures could be
said to exist in notarial law and in the system of registration of real estate
transactions.
The imperfect rules on the operation of private notaries seriously under-
mine the notarial form of authentification and often pave the way to cor-
ruption or serve as an incentive to crime in civil relationships or in the
course of court proceedings.
The existing system of registration fails to provide for genuine guarantees
and certainty in the case of real estate transactions. The lack of reliability
and legal certainty frequently results in fraud, abuse and corruption trans-
actions.
• Commercial law
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C.2. Civil Law and 
Procedure
In the field of commercial law, as well, there are legislative prerequisites
that invite acts directly or indirectly connected to corruption:
– Company law
Despite the high level of harmonization of Bulgarian company law with EC
company law that has been attained, no satisfactory degree of certainty
has yet been achieved in commercial and economic turnover. Nor has the
law been shown to be transparent and corruption-free. Such an objective
has been pursued with the amendments to the Commercial Law passed in
June 2003, in particular the detailed regulation of the companies’ transfor-
mation and the refined provisions aimed to divert the conflict of interests. 
Some of the provisions of the Law Amending and Supplementing the
Commercial Law endeavor to improve corporate governance (better legal
guarantees for the participation of shareholders in the general meeting,
improved corporate management and supervision rules, and avoidance of
conflict of interests). While these norms are inspired by a desire to restrict
the possibilities for corruption and to enhance transparency, it is still too
early to predict their effectiveness.
– The legal framework of corporate insolvency
Previous amendments to the rules on corporate insolvency have not result-
ed in any material acceleration of insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the
potential for attempts to obtain judgments more quickly by resorting to
corruption methods persists. References to the rules on execution laid
down in the Code of Civil Procedure also provoke complications and delay
the proceedings. The number of cases instituted in previous years and of
newly-opened insolvency proceedings remains excessive. The inadequate
and inefficient amendments made so far urge a fundamental and substan-
tial reworking of insolvency proceedings, as these are now endlessly ineffi-
cient and formalistic, and constitute a major source of corruption.
The latest amendments in the Commercial Law are designed to rectify a
major portion of those defects. The introduction of new specific rules and
presumptions applicable when proving the inability to discharge one’s
debts, the decisive shortening of most procedural time limits, and the pro-
vision that cases shall be heard at two court instances only, are all aimed at
ensuring the required speed of insolvency proceedings. Some other amend-
ments are targeted at eradicating the corruption methods employed by the
key players in any insolvency procedure, viz. trustees. Applicants who wish
to be added to the list of trustees must now pass a theoretical and practical
exam, a new system exists for the payment of trustees’ emoluments, and
trustees must take compulsory insurance with respect to their damage lia-
bility in cases in which they fail to fulfill their duties. The previous references
to the rules on enforcement in the Code of Civil Proceedings have been
replaced with comprehensive new norms on the judicial sale of a debtor’s
pool of assets.
• The system of company incorporation
The status of company incorporation forms part of the problem of registra-
tion in general, as addressed in detail in the Corruption Assessment Report
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2002. The inefficient system of court registration in Bulgaria is among the
factors that fuel corruption in the courts on a virtual daily basis.
• Labor law
Significant progress was made in 2003 in combating unequal treatment of
individuals, which often instigates corruption in labor relations. The Law on
the Protection against Discrimination (in effect as of January 1, 2004) almost
entirely incorporated the recommendations made in the Judicial Anti-
Corruption Program:
– A legal definition was provided of direct and indirect discrimination.
– An explicit rule was enacted to proclaim the principle of equal pay
for equal work or for work of equal value.
– A court procedure was introduced to protect the right of citizens to
equal treatment.
– The burden of proof in cases where discrimination is alleged will shift
onto the employer.
This means that Bulgarian labor law has been almost fully harmonized with
European anti-discrimination instruments. This finding has in fact been con-
firmed in the Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, pro-
duced by the European Commission in 2003.
• Civil liability for criminal offenses
The Draft Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquired through Criminal
Activity (prepared by the MoI in 2002) has kindled heated discussions on the
subject. The process of taking into account the relevant recommendations
and presenting the draft to parliament, however, has been delayed by more
than a year.
A number of provisions in that draft should be left out as they allegedly neg-
lect the role of the court and contravene the Constitution and domestic le-
gislation, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights and other sim-
ilar instruments. The draft may be reworded in such a way as to avoid the
violations of individual rights and freedoms in the course of its future
enforcement, while observing the following guarantees:
– Confining the scope of the law to offenses that involve organized
crime and pose an excessive level of threat to society, i.e., smug-
gling, traffic in persons or drugs, traffic in weapons, corruption of sen-
ior public officials, etc.
– Defining with precision the grounds for the institution of pro-
ceedings (sufficient evidence that the property in question was real-
ly acquired as a result of criminal activity).
– Making a shrewd determination of the competent bodies that will be
given the power to confiscate the property, and introducing effective
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monitoring mecha-
nisms for the opera-
tions of those bodies,
including judicial re-
view.
– Providing guarantees
for the protection of
those who will even-
tually be affected by
the enforcement of
the law, especially
third parties.
C.2.2. Civil Procedure: The State of Affairs
Being a general technique of protecting substantive legal relationships, civil
procedure is also a key tool to resist corruption transactions.
In 2003, however, no substantial measures were undertaken to improve the
framework of civil procedure and to free it from its sluggishness and ineffi-
ciency or from the corruption transactions abundant in all of its segments.
Some of the key reasons for the failures in civil procedure are inefficient or
completely lack of criminal repression which opens the door to all sorts
of abuse in the determination of civil claims, and the lack of working
mechanisms for attaching disciplinary, administrative or civil liability to
unlawful behavior. A sustainable public disrespect for justice is also per-
ceived, this in itself being a negative factor of particular weight.
The following problems of civil justice deserve notable attention:
– The existence of three instances entails in most cases lavish pro-
ceedings where the functions of the first and the second instance
largely overlap and procedural discipline is poor as evidence can be
submitted even when the case is reheard by the instance of cassation.
There are no good reasons why all cases should be handled by all the
three instances, and it is especially unacceptable for the facts of a
case to be established by two consecutive instances with similar pow-
ers in that respect.
– The frequent occurrences of irregular summoning and the infinite
avoidance tactics the parties employ are key contributors to the
excessive length of the proceedings. Despite several amendments
since 1997, myriad possibilities to delay the procedure are still there.
– The process of enforcement was substantially modified by the
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure enacted in November
2002 with the aim of improving and accelerating the proceedings.
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TABLE 24 OPINION ON THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF FORFEITURE BY THE STATE
(INCLUDING FREEZING AND SEIZURE) OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Agree Disagree Does not know/No response
It would be a device to quickly forfeit 
and freeze assets derived from criminal 
activity, thus contributing to a more 
efficient suppression of corruption 70.0 18.3 11.7
A good idea but no sufficient 
guarantees against possible abuse 75.8 11.9 12.3
It would not contribute to 
deterring corruption 19.8 61.0 19.2
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83.201TABLE 25 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE DIFFERENT 
SEGMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
Adversarial litigation 20.0
Collateral proceedings 5.9
Enforcement proceedings 14.8
Non-contentious litigation (including registration proceedings) 13.9
Other 0.9
Equally spread in all segments 12.1
No corruption exists in civil proceedings 5.3
Does not know/No response 27.1
Those amendments,
however, have not
included a thorough
elimination of the
existing deficiencies,
and their expected
corruption-deterring
effects have not yet
materialized.
– Under the existing
framework, the major
share of enforcement
and collateral pro-
ceedings, which lar-
gely predetermine the
economic contents
and the efficiency of
legal protection, fall
within the jurisdiction
of district courts and the disputed facts can never again be invoked
before the Supreme Court of Cassation. It should not be forgotten that
it is much easier for corruption transactions to occur at the local level.
According to the survey conducted among magistrates, one out of four
respondents believes that corruption is most widespread in adversarial civil
litigation. This opinion is mainly shared by public prosecutors and investi-
gators, while judges are convinced that corruption exists in non-contentious
litigation (including registration proceedings) and enforcement.
C.2.3. Required Legislative Amendments
Legislative amendments are needed that will have a comprehensive
impact on all factors which hinder modern and efficient administration of
justice in civil cases. The result should be lawful and fair court orders and
judgments of impeccable quality.
• Amendments to commercial law
Further amendments in this area are necessary for the development of cor-
ruption-free commercial and economic operations in the country. Those
changes, however, should be carefully considered and discussed with all
stakeholders. This would help establish a statutory framework matching the
everyday needs and avoid the turbulence of frequent amendments that
generate instability and uncertainty.
• Registration reform
The Corruption Assessment Report 2002 formulated the key proposals for reg-
istration reform (centralization, introducing administrative registration pro-
cedures, transforming the registries system into an electronic net, and grad-
ual expansion of the possibilities to upload and download information elec-
tronically). In 2003, those suggestions were refined in the publication
Opportunities for Establishment of Central Register of Legal Persons and Electronic
Registries Center in Bulgaria. This was a report produced by the Task Force on
Registration Reform with the Center for the Study of Democracy, and it met
with wide approval among the business circles, a number of government
agencies, and NGOs.
• Amendments to labor law
The issue of equal treatment
is of vital importance to the
reduction of corruption
transactions in the context of
labor relationships. The
good intentions that under-
lie the anti-discrimination
measures embedded in the
Law on the Protection against
Discrimination need to be
complemented by some
specific arrangements:
– Proposals for practi-
cal steps aimed at
the abolition and pre-
vention of discrimi-
nation with respect to
employment and the
professions should be
presented.
– Work of comparable
value should be pro-
vided for and a list of
supplementary pay-
ments should be
drawn up to uphold
the equal pay princi-
ple.
– The idea of setting up specialized labor courts warrants serious
attention. This would help reduce the pressure to commit corruption
acts, as case-law would become consistent and the hearing and
determination of cases would become much speedier. It is advisable
to reconsider the number of instances hearing labor disputes, while
reserving the cassation proceedings for only some groups of cases.
• Amendments to civil procedure
The entire paradigm of existing three-instance civil proceedings should
be revisited in light of the need to curb the possibilities of influencing mag-
istrates by corruption means. The following suggestions are made in this
context:
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Electronic Registries Center
Central Register of
Legal Entities
Central Property
Register
Central Pledges
Register
Tax
Registers
Register of Motor
Vehicles
Uniform System for
Registration of
Citizens
Other Connected
Registers
CHART 17 PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRIES CENTER
– Introduce regular two-instance proceedings, with a possibility for
an extraordinary review by the Supreme Court of Cassation of all
aspects of the substantive and procedural rules involved in a case,
while carefully developing the criteria for allowing such reviews. This
would be attained if the Supreme Court of Cassation stopped acting
as a regular instance and extraordinary review is introduced similar to
the review by overview procedure that existed before. Alternatively, the
Supreme Court of Cassation could keep its nature of a third regular
instance with a possibility to pronounce selectively. The possibilities
to remit the case back for rehearing by the lower instance should be
brought down to a minimum. The proceedings under § 231 et seq. of
the Code of Civil Procedure should be kept in place.
– An alternative would be to keep the regular three-instance proceed-
ings but sharply reduce the number of cases where the Supreme
Court of Cassation would pronounce (it should, 1) ensure the accu-
rate and uniform application of the laws by all courts when it comes
to fundamental issues of law-enforcement, or, 2) pronounce on cases
where very large public or financial interests are at stake).
– If the three-instance regular procedure is kept (regardless of whether
the Supreme Court of Cassation would be empowered to pronounce
selectively), parties should be allowed to “skip instances” where the
appeal only concerns the correct application of substantive rules.
– The number of instances involved in the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments needs to be reconsidered as well.
– Proceedings at first instance should be seriously revisited by intro-
ducing a compulsory exchange of memoranda between the parties
before an open hearing is scheduled. The parties should be obliged
to make all of their relevant allegations and induce any evidence at
their disposal before they appear in the courtroom for an open hear-
ing.
– One possible effect of that approach would be a larger number of set-
tlements at the outset of the process. Depending on the evidentiary
material collected prior to the court stage, the court should have the
power to instruct (or in some cases oblige) the parties to resort to
mediation or conciliation with the help of qualified experts. Some
courts in the country (Plovdiv, Assenovgrad) are already applying
such practice. A Draft Law on Mediation is being discussed by the
Council of Ministers and is to be submitted to the National Assembly
in 2004. This could make the number of settlements even larger. At
the same time account should be taken of the potential for corrup-
tion that would be inherent in such an arrangement. 
– It is necessary to rethink the rules on the statements made by the
parties to a case. The current situation where the parties can factu-
ally “conceal the truth or state untruth” in the process, without any
liability, is grossly unacceptable from the point of view of modern
requirements. Any opportunity should be excluded to submit evi-
dence (other than new facts or newly-discovered or newly-created
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evidence within the meaning of § 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
after the exchange of memoranda and papers between the parties.
That, however, should be achieved by precluding the possibility of
inducing evidence later, rather than by imposing sanctions (as the lat-
ter are usually inadequate or simply not applied).
– The rules on the various types of evidentiary means should be
updated. This is especially relevant in light of the latest technological
developments, e.g., the large-scale use of the Internet, and the intro-
duction of e-signatures and e-commerce. On the other hand, abuse
of the existing rules has reached disproportionate dimensions.
– The role of expert witnesses in the proceedings should be reconsid-
ered by introducing guarantees, including an Ethics Code for expert
witnesses, so as to ensure that they will act in good faith.
– The rules on the modifications of the claim should be adjusted by
adding an explicit mention that a plaintiff “may modify or comple-
ment his or her claim”.
– The keeping of minutes at open court hearings should be expressly
reformulated. Given the modern technical methods of recording the
statements of parties, witnesses and experts, it is no longer appropri-
ate for the proceedings to be recorded “under the dictation” of the
presiding judge. This is especially inappropriate with respect to wit-
ness testimony as witnesses face criminal liability for false statements.
– The provisions on the award of costs and expenses should be
improved by stipulating that contingency fees payable in future shall
be subject to reimbursement as well.
– The rules on fast-track proceedings should be revisited, including those
on appeals against delays. Such appeals should be lodged with the
president of the court where the case is pending, and this route should
also be available in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Cassation
(if the current workload of that institution remains unchanged).
• Summoning and serving notice
The rules on summoning and those on serving notices and other court
papers should also be fundamentally revised by making the following
amendments:
– The initial summoning for hearings should be based on new provi-
sions. The requirement that the initial summoning of all legal entities
should take place at the address of their management must be
refined. As to natural persons, there should be a rule for the situation
in which the summonsing officer is physically unable to contact the
addressee of the summons as the entrance of the building is not read-
ily accessible.
– The person who signs the summon should be required to enter in it
all of his or her names and his or her address (for that purpose, an
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amendment to the existing framework should empower the sum-
monsing officer to check the signatory’s identity papers).
– Serious liability should result from any failure of summonsing offi-
cers to issue the summons as prescribed by law. It should be explic-
itly stated that such offenses would entail “disciplinary dismissal.”
This proposal is based on the existence of the widespread practice of
summonsing officers receiving bribes—which largely exceed the fine
they face—in order not to summon a party properly.
– Where the case is adjourned and the next hearing is not immediate-
ly scheduled, the party should take care to inform him- or herself
of the date of the next hearing.
– It is appropriate to think about pronouncing the judgments in civil
cases in an open hearing (and both parties should be aware of the date
of the hearing). In this case, it would become unnecessary to serve the
party with a notice that the text of the judgment and its reasons are
ready, as this is a major factor contributing to procedural delays.
– A rule should be introduced that, if an individual cannot be found at
his or her permanent address for more than 15 days, the summons
should be left at the municipality in question and summoning should
be deemed regular.
– Another option is also open to discussion, namely for the court
papers to be served by out-of-court entities, subject to detailed
agreements with the court and to strict requirements (Great Britain
and France serve as good examples of the efficacy of this practice).
The court would thus be relieved of excessive technical work, where-
as the contractors would have the motivation and the interest to per-
form well and on time.
Finally, it is recommended to introduce the principle that, once a party has
been properly summoned for the case, that party should bear the burden of
informing him- or herself about the development of the proceedings up
until their end through all regular instances. This would certainly require the
supply of technical equipment and facilities for the remote provision of
information to the citizens who need it.
• Collateral proceedings and enforcement
It is mandatory to uphold the rights of those seeking protection in collater-
al and enforcement proceedings by allowing review by the Supreme Court
of Cassation (as restricted and selective as that review might be). In relation
to that the following steps are suggested:
– The rules on allowing and obtaining collateral should be funda-
mentally changed by taking account of the fact that security may be
necessary regardless of the type of action brought.
– The grounds for enforcement should be reconsidered; for example,
is it appropriate to maintain grounds for enforcement titles like the
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ones in § 237(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (like promissory notes),
which are often times employed for horrific abuse.
– The rules on enforcement should be entirely revised. The only
acceptable modern solution to the issue of foreclosure is to have auc-
tions with open bidding, coupled with an unrestricted right to submit
bids.
– Radical changes to enforcement proceedings are necessary, including
through the adoption of new legal instruments regulating in detail the
status and the powers of bailiffs, and the procedural issues pertaining
to judicial enforcement. Viewpoints on this vary from proposals for
introducing private enforcement (the enactment of such rules in the
Czech Republic enabled the closure of 39,000 cases in a matter of six
months) to proposals for reforming the state enforcement (as envis-
aged in a project on reforming the state enforcement, carried out by
the Ministry of Justice, with the financial support of the European
Commission—Phare 2000). 
Contradictions arise when specific proposals for reform in civil procedure
are analyzed. On the one hand, the proposed reform is aimed at curbing
and combating corruption in the area of civil procedure and civil law. On
the other hand, some of the proposed options for a new framework of civil
procedure may be expected to give rise to new sources of corruption. It
could be safely assumed that giving the courts wider freedom (such as selec-
tive pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Cassation) would generate
such new hubs of corruption.
Nonetheless, the construction of a system of a high-quality and effective
civil procedure should be given priority, as the very fact of its existence
would serve as a guarantee that corruption will be reduced and combated.
Corruption in the administrative area undermines trust in the state’s author-
ity, in the judicial system and in public administration, and tends to be per-
ceived as a criminal feature of the system itself rather than as a series of
criminal acts committed by individual organizations, institutions or officials.
Some essential reasons for the significant growth of corruption in the
administrative sphere could be summarized as follows:
– There is a lack of a clear system of judicial review of the steps under-
taken by the administration.
– The rules on the determination of administrative disputes are some-
what obscure.
– The limits of operational autonomy discretion granted to the admin-
istration are rather ambiguous and are not always subject to control.
– The bureaucratic machinery is slow and clumsy.
– No specific attention is paid to ethics in the public administration and
in administrative justice.
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C.3. Administrative Law 
and Procedure
– There is weak or altogether lacking confidence of citizens in the steps
made by the administrative and judicial authorities.
A series of measures were undertaken in 2003 that have strong anti-corrup-
tion potential and are relevant to the modernization of public administra-
tion and to the reform of administrative justice.
• Measures to modernize the public administration
In January 2003, the Council of Ministers approved a Program for
Modernization of the State Administration and a Plan for Implementing the
Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration. The strategy was updat-
ed in September 2003. Those instruments outline a number of legislative
reforms and institution-building measures designed to optimize the pattern
of organization and operation of the public administration. The strategy fol-
lows the recommendations of the European Commission for a capacity-
building model for the public administration and for the fulfillment of the
obligations stemming from Bulgaria’s anticipated membership of the
European Union and its future participation in the EU structural funds.
The strategy foresaw the implementation of the “one-stop shop” princi-
ple which was introduced in the beginning of 2003 through pilot projects
run at five central administrations: the Directorate for National
Construction Supervision, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the
General Labor Inspectorate, the Employment Agency, and the National
Social Assistance Service, as well as in a number of municipalities. By 2005,
all administrations should provide their services based on the “one-stop
shop” principle. A better and speedier service for the citizens is expected to
ensue from the implementation of mechanisms that ensure open access of
citizens to the administration, the possibility to track the path of every
administrative service offered, and to check the level of approval of admin-
istrative work.
In March 2003, a Council for the Modernization of the State Administration
was established, as provided for in the Plan for Implementing the Strategy for
Modernization of the State Administration. The council is chaired by a vice
prime minister and is expected to bring the operation of the public admin-
istration in harmony with the requirements stemming from Bulgaria’s acces-
sion to the European Union.
As of 2003, the Register of Administrative Structures and of the Acts of the
Administrative Bodies collects information inter alia on all existing regulatory
regimes (licensing, registration, authorization, or equivalent regimes) and on
the acts of the executive issued in implementation of those regimes. It is,
however, necessary to centralize the entirety of information concerning the
regulatory regimes, as it is now scattered over many other registers kept by
individual ministries or other administrative bodies.
Based on the Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration, the E-
Government Strategy was approved at the end of 2002. It focuses on the
establishment of a single administrative system to provide services to
businesses, citizens, and administrative bodies through modern infor-
mation technologies.
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Although e-government was officially launched at the end of September
2003, the practice of providing and receiving services online remains under-
developed. The success of the project for electronic public procurement
based on universal e-signatures (implemented by the Ministry of Finance)
will be of key relevance here; it is expected to greatly contribute to curbing
corruption in the field of public procurement, which is highly susceptible to
improper pressure.
This is a good initial step towards establishing a solid foundation for the
work of the administration to be corruption-resistant, in line with the needs
of modern society and with European standards. Nonetheless, more promi-
nent and comprehensive measures are required to ensure the necessary
quality of administrative service, its lawfulness and swiftness, and to limit
corruption.
• Measures to reform administrative law and procedure
Administrative justice exists to resolve disputes over the lawfulness of acts
issued by the Council of Ministers, the prime minister, the vice prime min-
isters, the ministers, heads of other agencies immediately subordinate to the
government, district governors, or other administrative acts. Hence, admin-
istrative proceedings play an essential part in the political process and fre-
quently become a junction for different, often opposing interests whose
protection is sought through corrupt means. Grounding those proceedings
in a solid anti-corruption foundation is therefore a vital prerequisite for
making administrative justice modern, efficient, and fair.
The lack of consistent administrative legislation and procedures is still a
major problem of administrative law. The numerous amendments to sub-
stantive administrative laws are frequently discrepant, give rise to many
gaps and ambiguities, and invite conflicting interpretation. Almost no steps
were undertaken in 2003 to improve this situation, regardless of the impor-
tant progress made in devising the conceptual framework of administrative
procedures.
The major proposed changes include drafting a Code of Administrative
Procedure, reforming administrative justice, including through building up a
system of administrative courts, and modifying the mechanisms for lodging
appeals with administrative bodies. Work on the Draft Code of Administrative
Procedure is already in progress and it is expected to be finalized by the end
of 2004.
The updated version of the Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary in Bulgaria,
approved by the government on April 3, 2003, provides for the formation of
specialized administrative courts. Discussions and specific solutions in that
respect are still to come.
The reform of administrative law and procedure is aimed at improving
the legal and organizational framework of administrative justice in order to
prevent corruption by introducing a modern system of administrative legis-
lation and setting up efficient mechanisms to keep the work of public
administration under judicial review.
80 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2003
C.3.1. Administrative Law: The State of Affairs
With a view to combating corruption in the process of enforcing adminis-
trative law, the following major problems in substantive administrative pro-
visions should be enumerated:
• Establishing a uniform organizational pattern for the public administration
Regardless of the legislative measures undertaken to implement a uniform
organizational pattern and common internal rules for the administrative
structures of all executive bodies, be they central or local (the Law on
Administration, in effect as of November 5, 1998 and the Ordinance on the
Conditions and Procedure for Keeping a Register of Administrative Structures and
the Acts of the Administrative Bodies, in effect as of May 26, 2000), corruption
still affects to a greater or lesser degree the administration of all of those
bodies.
– The measures aimed to make the work of individual administrations
more transparent are, as yet, far from sufficient. While almost all of
the administrations have provided special reception rooms where cit-
izens can file applications or complaints, there are no efficient feed-
back mechanisms or adequate legal rules.
– Although legislative provisions exist on how to exercise the right of
access to public information (the Law on Access to Public Information,
in effect as of July 10, 2000, and the Law on Protection of Classified
Information, in effect as of May 3, 2000), their implementation has
identified the lack of sufficient guarantees for transparency and
accountability and the persisting attempts of the administration to
retain for official use much of the information about its operations.
There are still opportunities to refuse, by invoking obscure criteria,
access to information constituting an official secret and this type of
environment is quite conducive to corruption.
– At the same time the annual reports on the situation in the adminis-
tration as a whole, and in some individual administrations, offer no
findings of corruption transactions or suggestions for specific
anti-corruption measures. It is still quite difficult to pinpoint the
indices that could be used to assess the efficiency of the administra-
tive operation and to manage performance in a purpose-oriented
manner.
• Establishing a professional civil service
The impression of the public that those working in the administration are
highly corruptible makes it crucial to analyze the implementation of the Law
on Civil Servants and the anti-corruption measures envisaged therein, includ-
ing those enacted through the latest amendments of 2003.
• In line with the Law on Civil Servants, the status of civil servants has been
introduced in 96% of the central administrative structures, in the district
administrations, and the municipal administrations. That status, howev-
er, does not apply to those working at the National Audit Office and
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in the tax administration, irrespective of the responsible supervisory
functions vested in those bodies. The scope of the Law on Civil Servants
does not extend to expert posts in the general administration which are
still governed by the Labor Code. The number of employees working
under contracts of employment in the administration is therefore twice
higher than the number of civil servants. This is also due to the persisting
trend to insert into sector-specific legislation only a few “beneficial” ele-
ments of the civil servant status, without considering the status as a
whole in the respective sector. These factors continue to obstruct the
promotion of a system of professional civil service based on corruption-
free behavior and culture.
• The Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Civil Servants (in effect as
of November 1, 2003) contains a number of anti-corruption provi-
sions. Competitions are now compulsory for any appointment to the
civil service, and will follow uniform procedures. This is a prerequisite to
ensure objective selection based on professional merit. However, the
possibility given to any head of administration to appoint at his or her
own choice any of the first three applicants ranked by the competition
committee, rather than the best-performing candidate, still fosters cor-
ruption.
As of November 2003, the Register of Administrative Structures and of the Acts
of the Administrative Bodies is filled with information about all competitions
for civil servants in the state administration. This is an additional factor
expected to promote transparency and to reduce corruption transactions
when appointing civil servants.
The scope of statutory prohibitions on appointment laid down in § 7(2) of
the Law on Civil Servants has been extended. It now covers many situations
that constitute a conflict of interests and normally create a corruption-
friendly environment, e.g., relations with next-of-kin, business activities, or
holding posts in political parties. A conflict of interest disclosure mechanism
has been put in place. It will operate on the basis of annual filings by civil
servants to disclose the commercial, financial or other business interests
which they or their related parties have in the operation of the administra-
tion where the respective servant works. In addition, civil servants must
refrain from participating in the discussions on, the preparation of, and the
making of decisions where their impartiality is reasonably doubted. The
promulgation of a Code of Conduct for Public Officials is envisaged, and its vio-
lation would entail disciplinary sanctions.
• The lack of a clear-cut division between the powers of the separate administra-
tions
The interweaving of powers most often results in duplicating work or reshuf-
fling responsibilities which, in turn, is conducive to abuse and creates an
environment conducive to corruption transactions.
• No uniform concept of “administrative act” exists
– Different legal instruments prescribe different contents and scopes
for the concept of “administrative act”. There is no uniform legal cri-
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terion to be used for excluding some administrative acts from judicial
review. All this impedes the definition of the type of act at stake and
frustrates the proceedings designed to review the legality of such acts.
– Equally lacking is a distinction between the individual administra-
tive acts issued by the state in its capacity as a carrier of the executive
authority to regulate and organize, and the acts issued by the state in
its capacity as an economic operator who manages and disposes with
state-owned property14. Identical arrangements for appealing against
such essentially different instruments frequently block normal eco-
nomic life, thus creating preconditions for corruption transactions.
• The practice of “tacit refusals”
This structure has been preserved almost entirely in the shape in which it
existed in an earlier social setting, where there was no division of powers.
Therefore, it provides no guarantees for the respect of citizens’ rights in the
modern environment. The sole exception to the tacit refusal rule is the
issuance of authorizations and certificates for one-off transactions or
actions. In such cases, the newly-adopted Law on Limiting Administrative
Regulation and the Administrative Control on Economic Operations (in effect as
of December 18, 2003) proclaims the principle of tacit consent. This possi-
bility, however, is not comprehensive as it will only apply where it is not
otherwise provided by other laws. Discrepant secondary legislation has not
yet been brought into line with the new law. While the law is a step towards
the speedier and more efficient provision of administrative services, the
insufficient capacity of the central or territorial administrations to imple-
ment it, and the existence of rules that invite different interpretations, pave
the way for corruption transactions.
The rules on challenging tacit refusals before the court are equally unsatis-
factory under the new circumstances. The appeals procedure is slow and
costly, so many private individuals prefer to dispense with it.
The frequent instances of tacit refusals, which are more often than not the
result of corruption transactions, entail the uncontrollable transfer to the
court of functions that are typical of the administration. The courts thus
engage in inappropriate activities (they decide on issues of governance and
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14 Judgment No. 19 of the Constitutional Court of December 23, 1993 in case No. 11/93 describes
the power of the Council of Ministers, which is the highest administrative authority in the coun-
try, to organize the management of state-owned property as a “typically managerial function”.
The vast material scope of that constitutional power is defined as covering not only the two types
of property the state may have in Bulgaria, i.e., public and private property, but also other rights
and duties of the state that can be valued in money. Express mention is made of the fact that in
the context of that organizational activity, the Council of Ministers may issue acts but the same
activity could also be carried out by individual ministers or by other bodies empowered by the
Council of Ministers to do so. In other words, in its capacity as a high executive body, the
Council of Ministers decides on the basis of expediency who and how should manage that prop-
erty, unless otherwise provided in law. At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that the
rules applying to sites which form either private or public (other than exclusive) property of the
state or the municipalities shall be laid down by law, and in the exercise of their right to private
property the state and the municipalities shall be placed on an equal footing with all citizens and
legal entities.
power that fall entirely within the competence of public administration) and
this fuels secondary corruption at the level of the administration of justice.
• Operational autonomy
The widest field for corruption in the administrative sphere is the so-called
operational autonomy (discretion). The lack of adequate controls for law-
fulness or advisability frequently transforms operational autonomy into arbi-
trary or illegal steps by the administration, and all these factors contribute to
corruption to the largest possible extent.
Some laws contain legal rules which precondition corruption as they give
powers to the administrative bodies but fail to identify any criteria or to give
instructions as to why a particular law should regulate specific cases of
clashing interests. The existing “undefined” concepts or expressions in some
laws also enable broad interpretation and enforcement and, hence, cor-
ruption (for example “incongruous speed”, a concept used in § 20(2) of the
Law on Road Traffic). Such provisions greatly risk becoming corruption-gen-
erating incentives, especially when used in privatization and public pro-
curement laws.
C.3.2. Administrative Procedure: The State of Affairs
In view of the reform of administrative proceedings, the following major
problems emerge from the analysis of the legal framework:
• The existence of multiple sources of administrative-procedure rules, some of
which belong to other areas of law
In this situation, control over the administration becomes rather inefficient,
the responsibilities of the different supervisory authorities are watered
down, the reputation of judicial review is compromized, citizens are poor-
ly informed about how and where they should challenge illegal or incorrect
administrative acts, and so forth.
– There is no clear distinction between administrative-procedure
law and existing procedural codes, viz. the Code of Tax Procedure,
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure. The
Code of Tax Procedure, for instance, provides for a special route of
challenging tax reassessments, which differs from the common one
envisaged in the Law on Administrative Proceedings.
– References to the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal
Procedure often result in inaccuracy, gaps, or even inconsistencies
with administrative procedure laws. This is due to the different legal
nature of the relations covered by each of those instruments. This sit-
uation is an enormous impediment to efficient administrative justice.
– The interpretative decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court
(SAC) cannot substitute for the statutory rules and should not settle
lasting relations of administrative procedure, or else there will be
conflicting pronouncements, fragmentation and inconsistency.
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In brief, the existing legal framework fails to contribute to the development
and operation of a consistent and uniform system of administrative justice,
whereas the discrepant, non-standardized sets of administrative proceed-
ings may push the courts to adopt different approaches, thus fueling cor-
ruption transactions. 
• The absence of unambiguous legal rules on some procedures and on major
legal structures
The cassation appeals against court judgments in administrative cases give
rise to problems which have not been definitely or explicitly addressed by
the administrative-procedure legislation in force, at least not to date. The
subsidiary application of the Code of Civil Procedure is insufficient, nor is that
code fit to serve as a comprehensive legal basis for the complex and specif-
ic area of administrative justice.
The introduction of corporate administrative liability is still on the agen-
da. In practice this is the only possibility to penalize corporate corruption
given the hindrances in existing Bulgarian legislation and legal doctrine. In
the course of the work on the concept for the Code of Administrative
Procedure, the proposal for introducing corporate administrative liability for
corruption-related or other crimes committed by legal entities’ employees
has been adopted. Recommendations to that effect were noted in the last
Regular Report of the European Commission. 
• Failure to respect and comply with court acts
The relations between the court and the administrative bodies that
issued the acts under attack are somewhat problematic as well. Forwarding
of administrative files is often delayed, the court is denied assistance by the
administrative bodies’ failure to provide relevant facts and submissions to
clarify the disputes, and there are instances of failure to fulfill judgments.
On the other hand, corruption transactions are suspected whenever the
competent administrative body which must act to implement a court judg-
ment or the instructions of the court fails to comply with the judgment or to
fulfill the instructions. The administrative penalties envisaged for such cases
are extremely inefficient and, even worse, are often not enforced.
C.3.3. Required Legislative Amendments
• In the field of administrative law
Changes are imperative in substantive administrative law, particularly in the
legal instruments that regulate the work of the administration, along the fol-
lowing lines:
– Introducing wider accountability and access to the information
kept by public authorities so as to reduce the chances for corruption
acts or omissions.
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– Regulating operational autonomy by adopting internal rules that
should define the method of decision-making when such autonomy
is granted. All possible actions that an authority could undertake in
exercising its operational autonomy should be foreseen by the law.
– Anchoring the career promotion of civil servants in demonstrated dili-
gence in their performance, introducing fair and transparent career
development procedures, and reducing to a minimum the room for
conflicts of interest by relying comprehensively on the anti-corruption
potential of the newly-passed amendments to the Law on Civil Servants.
– Promoting a general system to improve the professional knowledge
and skills of those working in the administration. An important factor
here could be the introduction of a systematic training for civil ser-
vants in corruption-related matters at the Institute of Public
Administration and European Integration.
– Putting in place a reliable feedback mechanism to stay in touch with
service users, so that their skills could be employed to improve the
process of administrative servicing and to suppress corruption.
– Revising completely the practice of “tacit refusal” and the appeals
against such refusals. If those refusals are retained, on appeal, the
court must always review the decision and decide on the liability of
the corresponding administrative body or of the person who failed to
pronounce on time, while imposing penalties in the same proceed-
ings. It would be better to proclaim the principle that failure of the
administration to pronounce on time shall be construed as a reply in
the affirmative to the request addressed to it. This means extending
the scope of “tacit consent” as enshrined in the newly-adopted Law
on Limiting Administrative Regulation and the Administrative Control on
Economic Operations. Tacit consent should actually become the gen-
eral rule. There should be scarce possibilities to provide for different
rules in other laws, secondary legislation should be harmonized with
the rules of the law, and the administrative capacity of the competent
bodies should be reinforced by way of training and improving the
efficiency of their officials.
• In the field of administrative procedure 
Further improvements in the legal and organizational framework of admin-
istrative justice are associated with the following specific proposals:
– Drafting a Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP), which has already
started. It should cover the subject matter of administrative proceed-
ings in the widest possible sense, as these are currently governed
ambiguously and in a discrepant manner by myriad other laws.
Explicit rules are needed to bridge the gaps in administrative proce-
dure and CAP should not copy provisions or matters from the Code of
Civil Procedure.
– CAP should prescribe the general rules of administrative proce-
dure, including the proceedings for issuing administrative acts, the
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enforcement of such acts, the imposition of administrative penalties,
and the appeals against those acts before another administrative
body or before the court. Special rules of procedure should exist for
urgent and justified cases but they should also be contained in a spe-
cific chapter of CAP. References to other procedural codes must be
few and should only be made where they cannot be avoided.
– CAP should define the concepts of individual administrative acts,
administrative acts of general application, and instruments of sec-
ondary legislation. It should also define the meaning and the status of
the “parties concerned”. It should provide for corporate administra-
tive liability and for stiffer administrative sanctions for administrative
agencies that fail to abide by court judgments. The code should cover
the liability of the state and the compensation for damage caused by
such administrative acts or by failure to act.
– Once CAP is enacted, it will be necessary to adopt unified rules on
the work of the administration in issuing administrative acts. Based
on those rules, the administrative bodies should adopt their own inter-
nal regulations for each type of act of individual or general application,
and those internal regulations should be announced in public and be
accessible. Specific training programs should be designed to tackle the
implementation of the future Code of Administrative Procedure.
– Setting up a new unified system of administrative courts—region-
al administrative courts and a Supreme Administrative Court: pros
and cons
Support for the setting up a new unified system of regional administrative
courts (a proposal embedded in the updated Strategy for Reform of the
Judiciary in Bulgaria) is based on the current drawbacks of administrative jus-
tice which stem from the lack of specialization at first instance. It is recom-
mended that, when those regional courts are set up, responsibility be
assigned to the professionals at those district courts which currently have
operational administrative divisions, while precluding the possible “remote-
ness of justice from the people”.
The views against such a system also take account of the need to have spe-
cialization in administrative cases at first instance, but this should ideally be
achieved based on the current pattern of specialization in civil or criminal
cases. Arguments against the proposal to set up separate administrative
courts mainly suggest that this is unreasonable in terms of the quantity,
structure, and funding involved.
In either case the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court should
be clearly delineated and the institution should be enabled to efficiently
implement its constitutional powers to exercise supreme supervision in
order to ensure the accurate and uniform application of law in the process
of administrative justice. To that effect the SAC should also issue interpre-
tative decisions to streamline inconsistent case-law.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM: . . . 87
88 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2003
89
D. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON 
ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN THE JUDICIARY
In recent years the role of the judiciary in the system of democratic institu-
tions has been receiving increased attention. The assessment of the devel-
opment in the national justice systems has become a key criteria for the suc-
cess of reforms in the transition countries. In this context, the growing inter-
national interest in the process of judicial reform in Bulgaria, as well as the
high expectations for dealing with the problems in the judiciary in the con-
text of EU accession, are well founded. 
The slow pace of reform has mostly prompted critical assessments by inter-
national institutions, foreign governments and Bulgarian NGOs. The drawn-
out administration of justice and human rights violations (evident in the
many cases brought against Bulgaria in the European Court of Human
Rights, although those violations were allegedly committed in the period of
1993-1998), low public trust in the judiciary, the spread of corruption, and
the impunity of offenders, particularly among magistrates, are most often
quoted as problematic issues. Thus in recent years all international institu-
tions and major foreign partners highlighted the importance of an acceler-
ated judicial reform for the success of both integration efforts and overall
reforms in the country. 
There exists “a general perception that the judiciary had achieved insuffi-
cient results in the combat of crime, especially as concerns organized crime
and corruption, including corruption in the judiciary itself.” 
Reform of the Judicial System in Bulgaria, Conclusions adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 55th plenary session (Venice, 13-14 June
2003) “Deficiencies in the administration of justice represent the country’s
most outstanding democracy-related problem.”
USAID/Bulgaria Graduation Strategy 2003-2008, p.49
The link between judicial reform and integration is acknowledged in the
Judicial Reform Strategy adopted by the government October 2001: “The
strategy’s main purpose is the development of European standards in jus-
tice, by defining the political and legislative priorities of the reform of the
judiciary, that will contribute to the process of preparation of the Republic
of Bulgaria in order to join the European Union. The strategy complies with
the requirements and commitments that Bulgaria has accepted in the
National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis and with the priorities of
the Accession Partnership.”
The interest of foreign partners in the outcome of the reforms—in particular
those in the judicial power—is a key factor for their success and is undoubt-
edly beneficial to political developments in Bulgaria. Arguably, the current
focus on the judiciary—specifically in the field of anti-corruption—and the
need for constitutional changes would not have materialized in 2003 with-
out such interest from abroad (it is indicative that the changes in the
Constitution came to be dubbed “the Ferheugen amendment”).
Communicating this concern appropriately will determine the extent to
which the Bulgarian public will come to realize that it is not inspired prima-
rily by a quest for certain advantages (say, in the process of negotiations) but
rather aims at creating long-term trust by Bulgaria’s international partners.
One of the best practices exemplifying this is the cooperation between
Bulgaria and Spain. In 2003 the Spanish model of transition from an author-
itarian state to democracy was a matter of a number of exchanges between
the two countries. By means of a project with the Bulgarian Supreme
Judicial Council (SJC) and several visits by senior Spanish magistrates and
government officials the Bulgarian institutions came to better understand
the political consensus that has been underpinning the Spanish transition
and which was manifested in a State Pact on the Judicial Reform. Its four
main elements—independence and efficiency of the judiciary, legislative
amendments, organizational reforms, and reform in the administration and
infrastructure of the judiciary—are particularly relevant to the current status
of reforms in Bulgaria. 
The key impact of the involvement of foreign partners and institutions in
judicial reform in Bulgaria is the encouragement of political consensus on
the reform priorities. In the context of extreme partisanship by political
parties—which nonetheless have no meaningful policy differences in this
area—Bulgaria’s international integration commitments facilitate the adop-
tion of consensual policies. 
Still, foreign influence on anti-corruption reforms could bear a number of
risks.
First, concern of international institutions often suffers from short-termism.
This gives rise to unrealistic expectations for quick fixes which in turn could
encourage the adoption of superficial measures. It does not encourage
accountability and could lead to ad hoc measures which, although needed,
could only be effective in a broader context of developments. 
Second, the so called conditionalities posed by international institutions—
aimed at linking integration progress (i.e., to the EU) or the availability of
loans (i.e., from the World Bank) to effective judicial reforms—commit
mainly the executive and do not produce direct consequences for the
judicial power. The positive effect of external influence could be further
diminished in the context of a rift between the government and the magis-
trates, the controversy surrounding the proposals for a change in the status
of some of the branches of the judiciary, and the discussions of the new role
of the court administration. This approach does not contribute to enhanc-
ing the accountability of magistrates to society nor to increased transparen-
cy in their work. As a result, the understanding among magistrates of the sig-
nificance of EU membership is at a lower level than in the executive. 
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Third, there is risk of shifting priorities. A probable reason is that political
attention has limited capacity, but this could still be detrimental to the sus-
tainability of reforms. For example, the 1995 EU Madrid Summit made pub-
lic administration reform a priority although the judiciary was even less
advanced in its reforms. During the last couple of years attention has shift-
ed to the role of magistrates in Bulgaria while reforms in the administration
could hardly be said to have been completed. 
Being aware of these risks would enhance the effectiveness of assistance
provided by international institutions. Making the judiciary more involved
in a three-way cooperation process with foreign partners and the govern-
ment would diminish fears that reforms are somehow aimed at undermin-
ing judicial independence. 
It is also crucial that foreign encouragement of specific reforms makes sense
from the point of view of the logic of integration, as there is a tendency to
lump together various policies or to follow the political debate in the coun-
try. In 2003, for example, the European Commission conditioned negotia-
tions progress to certain judicial reforms about which most political parties
have already reached a consensus. The constitutional amendments of
September 2003 (concerning immunity, the mandate of governing magis-
trates, and irreplaceability), while important to a more accountable judici-
ary, are hardly directly relevant to an “ability to take on the obligations of
membership.” Further—probably partly due to recent problems with crime
in the country—the criminal law aspects of reform are being prioritized at
the expense of concerns over judicial capacity to evenly and effectively
apply the rules of the single market. 
A key factor for the effectiveness of foreign involvement in judicial reforms
in Bulgaria is the coordination of messages from abroad. In this respect, a
best practice could be found in the approach of the EU, USAID and the
World Bank. These institutions have, by and large, harmonized their
approaches and WB assistance, while provided in crucial integration areas,
does not overlap with EU and USAID support, with USAID reflecting WB
conditionalities in its assistance programs thus helping Bulgaria comply. The
preparation of the $150m Programmatic Adjustment Loan for Bulgaria (PAL
2) targets the improvement of public sector governance, including judiciary
reform and eradicating corruption. In order to receive the loan, the gov-
ernment of Bulgaria is supposed to meet a previously-negotiated set of con-
ditions concerning these reforms. The policy dialogue on negotiating and
fulfilling these conditions is, in its own right, a learning process for the
Bulgarian side. 
The relation between the policy messages of foreign partners and interna-
tional organizations and the concrete financial and technical assistance they
provide is of key importance to the overall impact. On the surface, the fact
that technical assistance is delivered for objectives that are also conditions
to be met before integration might seem contradictory. In fact, both policy
implications and funding are conducive to the accomplishment of reforms. 
With regard to this aspect, multilateral institutions like the EU and the
World Bank differ substantially from bilateral aid agencies. 
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• With multilateral institutions a state’s particular needs may not be met
at the appropriate time since both the political agenda and assistance
programs depend on a long and complex coordination process. The
degree of financial and technical assistance they deliver is considerably
greater; this is why such assistance results in mostly long-term effects. 
• Bilateral aid agencies are much more flexible in terms of both the forms
of aid provision and the particular programs and projects. These differ-
ences strike a critical note with the judiciary due to its status and institu-
tional structure. In order for the assistance to achieve its full effect, donor
institutions must coordinate their priorities and approaches, not allowing
the common measure of competition between them to interfere. This is
all the more essential given that the executive and the judiciary are not
always capable of leading this process.  
The Magistrate Training Center (MTC), initially a non-governmental entity
established with the support of the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), is an example of good practice for judicial reform
support. Aided by the European Commission and USAID, in 2003 the MTC
has been under conversion into a public entity under the SJC, namely the
future National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The establishment of the NIJ is to be
finalized in early 2004. 
Donor institutions also diverge importantly in terms of where they place the
judicial system in their programmatic framework. In the EU Commission’s
Justice and Home Affairs agenda, for instance, judicial reform issues and the
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TABLE 26 PROJECTS WITH INTERNATIONAL GRANT OR INVESTMENT AID EITHER CURRENT 
OR LAUNCHED IN 200315
15 Source: Information of the Judicial Reform Working Group with the Donor Coordination Mechanism
16 These are round figures. There is no information available about the funding of some projects. 
17 The budget of the judiciary in 2003 was about €73 million. 
Ministry/Agency Number of projects Total amount(€)16
Ministry of Justice 6 12,130,000
Ministry of Justice, with the participation of the Supreme 
Judicial Council 5 24,710,000
Ministry of Justice, with the participation of the Supreme 
Administrative Court 2 1,080,000
Ministry of Justice, with the participation of other agencies 3 460,000
NGOs 35 1,593,000
The Public Prosecutor’s Office 3 6,340,000
Inter-agency 1 1,200,000
Total 55 47,513,00017
operation of executive law-enforcement bodies converge. This combination
derives from the logic of enlargement negotiations, which, as noted above,
involve mainly the government and the administration. For USAID, the judi-
ciary is a priority of its own, while the goals their support pursues are achieved
in one of several manners—directly (through the Supreme Judicial Council or
pilot courts), through the executive, or involving non-state actors. 
A positive development in this respect is the creation of a Donor Assistance
Co-ordination Mechanism with the Council of Ministers. It brings togeth-
er state institutions and the international donor community and certain
non-governmental organizations have been invited to take part, as well.
Judicial reform is among the areas the mechanism will cover. Bearing in
mind that of the 16 members of the relevant working group in 2003, only
two were magistrates, it is advisable to involve a greater number of judici-
ary representatives in the future. 
The form in which international support is provided is predetermined by
the institutional and structural peculiarities of the judicial system. One of
the frequently used options is the so called “pilot courts”, where a particu-
lar procedure is introduced, and training is conducted or some other type
of technical or financial support is provided. Pilots model successful prac-
tices, thus promoting their adoption by their counterparts in judicial units.
As a method of work it is suitable for a non-hierarchical structure, for it
achieves visible results in short periods. These results have a relatively per-
manent effect due to the low turnover in the judiciary. The only drawback
of the approach is that it only targets individual courts, failing to address the
shortcomings of the whole system.
There are some positive developments including the growing level of sec-
toral specialization of the various aid agencies, and the effort to target pilot
projects (e.g., USAID) at courts of varying size and workload so as to cover
the broadest possible range of issues: 
• Bilateral agencies such as USAID, the governments of Spain, the
Netherlands and UK, and others focus on training of both magistrates
and court administrations, on monitoring, and on pilot projects at indi-
vidual courts (e.g., introducing new software and automatic file man-
agement systems). 
• Multilateral institutions like the EU, the World Bank and the UNDP
underpin structural reform, regulatory reform and general capacity-
building measures. It should be stressed that a multitude of their projects
are funded and/or implemented by individual member countries (such
as Germany and Norway). 
The EU is the largest contributor to Bulgarian reforms, including judicial
reform, through the programs administered by the European Commission.
In 2003 a total of 11 judiciary-related projects were implemented under
EU’s enlargement instrument, PHARE. All of them had a public institution
as the main executor and coordinator (the Ministry of Justice in most cases).
The Supreme Judicial Council has not independently executed any PHARE
project so far, but two projects are in the pipeline. 
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18Source: Information of the Judicial Reform Working Group with the Donor Coordination
Mechanism
Seven of the PHARE projects were so-called “twinning” projects, with five
of those containingan investment component18. 
Title of the Project Type of Support
BG-0103.04 Streamlining of Bankruptcy Twinning project
Proceedings 
BG-0103.03 System for Career Development Technical assistance
and Professional Qualification of Magistrates 
and Clerical Staff in the Judiciary
PHARE Horizontal Programme Technical assistance
Reinforcement of the Rule of Law
PHARE 2002 Implementation of the Strategy Twinning project and 
for Reform of the Judiciary in Bulgaria investment component
PHARE 2002 Improvement of Administrative Twinning project
Justice in View of the Fight against Corruption
PHARE 2003 Reform of the Civil and Penal Twinning project
Procedures
PHARE 2003 Support of the Implementation Grant aid, investment
of the Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary component
through Introduction of Information 
Technologies
BG 02/IB-FI-02 Developing a National Grant aid, investment 
Cooperation and Information Exchange component
Network  for Protection of Intellectual 
and Industrial Property Rights
BG/2000/IB/JH/01 Twinning project and 
Strengthening the Public Prosecutor’s Office investment component
BG/2002/IB/JH/04 Twinning project and
Strengthening the institutional capacity investment 
of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for fighting  component
organized  and economic crime 
and corruption
Strengthening the interagency cooperation Twinning project and 
between Public Prosecutor’s Office and the investment component
Ministry of Interior in fighting organized 
crime and corruption 
Twinning projects are a popular form of providing technical assistance to
candidate countries. Many of those targeting justice and home affairs
include executive bodies as participants. Twinnings require direct contacts
between the respective Bulgarian agency and a member state government
institution and are thus more appropriate at the level of state administration
rather than in the judiciary. The portion of twinning projects is large due to
the fact that the Ministry of Justice is usually the key partner in PHARE proj-
ects. Yet ways must be found to make EU support directly available to the
judicial system (particularly to the SJC, whose role in international cooper-
ation and EU integration needs to be strengthened). 
* * *
The success of judicial reform in Bulgaria is strongly contingent on the com-
mitment of international partners. Their interest should continue to con-
tribute to a broader consensus between policy makers and the separate
branches of government.
The efficiency of such international support could be enhanced if the fol-
lowing two courses of action are taken: assistance should be provided in
priority areas defined as such on the basis of a broad political consensus;
and an independent technical and institutional capacity should be built
within the judiciary itself. Judicial independence—a characteristic para-
mount to its role in society—should be strengthened through the necessary
institutional resources, including those for the absorption of donor support.
Insufficient as transparency and accountability are in internationally assist-
ed projects in public institutions, effective judicial reform is unthinkable
without these. A stronger involvement of the judiciary in the integration
process would directly translate into the enhanced capacity for utilizing
international technical and financial support. 
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